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Estudios de economía

versión On-line ISSN 0718-5286

Estudios de Economía vol.48 no.2 Santiago jul. 2021

http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-52862021000200139 

Artículos

Pollution, green union, and network industry

Contaminación, sindicato verde e industria de redes

Luciano Fanti1 

Domenico Buccella2 

1Department of Economics and Management, University of Pisa, Italy

2Department of Economics, Kozminski University, Poland

Abstract:

In a network industry, this paper investigates the impact of network effects on total pollution under the presence of a union interested to “local” environmental damages (e.g., polluting production processes damaging workers’ health and the local environment where workers live). Under monopoly, it is shown that, on the one hand, network effects tend to increase the investments in the cleaning technology but, on the other hand, increase the polluting output; consequently, the effects on the total pollution are ambiguous. We also find that total pollution reduces (increases) with increasing network effects intensity if the market is sufficiently large (small). Moreover, the pollution-reducing result of increasing network effects appears when the existing network effects, the union’s environmental concerns and the technological efficiency are sufficiently large. These findings are qualitatively confirmed under Cournot duopoly, offering empirical, as well as policy, implication.

Keywords: Network goods; Cleaning technology; Pollution production; Green Unions; Monopoly; Cournot duopoly

Resumen:

Este documento investiga el impacto de los efectos de la red en la contaminación total bajo la presencia de un sindicato interesado en los daños ambientales “locales” (por ejemplo, contaminar los procesos de producción que dañan la salud de los trabajadores y el medio ambiente local). En régimen de monopolio, se demuestra que, por una parte, los efectos de red tienden a aumentar las inversiones en la tecnología de limpieza pero, por otra, a aumentar la producción contaminante; en consecuencia, los efectos sobre la contaminación total son ambiguos. También encontramos que la contaminación total se reduce (aumenta) con el aumento de la intensidad de los efectos de red si el mercado es lo suficientemente grande (pequeño). Estos hallazgos se confirman cualitativamente bajo el duopolio de Cournot, ofreciendo implicaciones empíricas y políticas.

Palabras clave: Bienes de red; Tecnología de limpieza; Producción de contaminación; Sindicatos Verdes; Monopolio; Duopolio de Cournot

Full text available only in PDF format.

Texto completo disponible sólo en PDF.

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Recibido: 0 de Junio de 2020; Aprobado: 0 de Agosto de 2021

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