Economic and Social Conditions

The social-isolation measures adopted by Moreno’s Government to contain COVID-19 in 2020 significantly deteriorated Ecuadorians’ living conditions ( ^{Olivares y Medina 2020} ; Abad Cisneros 2021; Castellanos Santamaría et al. 2021). The pandemic hit hard the already sluggish growth of the Ecuadorian economy. The country has not had consistently high economic growth rates in the last 30 years (see Figure 1 ). Ecuador had an average growth rate of 3% for the 1990-2019 period. Furthermore, growth rates showed a declining trend from the early 2000s, despite a few spikes. The restrictions that accompanied Covid-19 led to negative growth. According to preliminary figures from the Central Bank of Ecuador, the country experienced a 7.8% decline in economic growth for 2020 (see Figure 1 ), its most significant contraction in more than three decades. Thus, while the economy grew by 3%, on average, from 1990 to 2019, it experienced a contraction of 7.8% in 2020.

Source: Central Bank of Ecuador.

Figure 1 The economy was hard hit by Covid-19 (GDP growth rate) 

Ecuador’s 2020 GDP contraction shaped its social and political life. Investments and consumption, components of the GDP, were hardest hit by the pandemic. The restrictions on mobility and gatherings first led to a supply-side shock as firms adjusted their operations to the restrictions. The 19% decline in private investment in 2020 reflects this shock. Notably, as firms re-sized, a reduction in employment and other inputs led to a demand-side shock, leading to an 8.2% reduction in private consumption (see Figure 2 ). Covid-19 created a complex economic scenario that –it could be argued– affected other politically-relevant domains.

Source: Central Bank of Ecuador.

Figure 2 Private Consumption and Investment had severe declines (growth rate). 

Employment was one of the main social and economic domains affected by the pandemic. As already mentioned, firms adjusted to the new conditions, which required laying out workers. As a result, underemployment and unemployment increased considerably; underemployment and unemployment are two categories that reflect the employment status of the economically-active population who do not have adequate employment. More than half of the working population was underemployed or unemployed by June 2020, approximately three months after the initial confinement measures. To put these numbers in context, note that by December 2019, 17% of the population was underemployed, and 4.9% was unemployed. By June 2020, underemployment and unemployment reached 34.7% and 16.8% of the population. While employment figures recovered quickly, employment and underemployment remain higher than their pre-pandemic levels (see Figure 3 ).

Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, National Institute for Statistics and Census.

Figure 3 Underemployment and Unemployment increased (%). 

The other side of the economic coin is (income) poverty ( Figure 4 ). Not surprisingly, social indicators deteriorated with a decline in output and shrinking working opportunities. Poverty and extreme poverty increased during 2020. Poverty levels rose by approximately seven percentage points from December 2019 to December 2020; extreme poverty doubled within that same period climbing to double-digit figures. Thus, one of the most pressing tasks that Guillermo Lasso’s Administration faces is to promote economic and social recovery.

Source: National Institute of Statistics and Census.

Figure 4 Income Poverty and Extreme Poverty increased (%). 

Fiscal Conditions

The state of public finances is perhaps one of Ecuador’s biggest challenges. Ecuadorian governments have had more than a decade of fiscal deficits. As Figure 5 shows, from 2008 onwards, the Ecuadorian government spent more resources than it created; this placed the country in a challenging fiscal position in need of correction. Increasing government expenditures for salaries, consumption, and investment, has led to an unsustainable path; that is, government spending is growing faster than revenues and economic growth. Since expenditures are not flexible and taxes are not widespread, Ecuadorian governments have heavily relied on debt (internal and external) to make ends meet. Lenin Moreno partially alleviated this through debt renegotiation (from 2017 to 2021). However, this “solution” is no longer an option for Lasso. Issuing new sovereign debt or rolling existing debt are tools that the Ecuadorian government has not announced. Further, they are not part of Ecuador’s agreement with the IMF. Lasso’s government will require a combination of higher revenues and a reduction in expenditures to correct Ecuador’s fiscal mismanagement. The country needs to fix the state of public finances if it wants to renew its access to resources from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and international markets.

Source: Central Bank of Ecuador.

Figure 5 Fiscal Balance as a share of GDP (%) and USD (millions). 

Overall, we know that expenditures and revenues increased from 2000 onwards (see Figure 6 ). Nevertheless, there are several nuances in their growth rate and decline. Moreover, it is important to pay attention to the years in which changes occur. Public expenditures grew faster after 2007 compared to the early 2000s. There was a three-fold increase within seven years, from 2007 (the year Rafael Correa took office), until 2014, when expenditures reached their peak (during Correa’s third term). Since 2014, total expenditures have

Source: Central Bank of Ecuador.

Figure 6 Government’s Revenues and Expenditures (millions of USD). 

consistently declined. While oil and non-oil revenues also increased since 2000, their growth rate did not follow the pace of growth of expenditures. In fact, oil revenues have declined since 2011, and non-oil revenues have taken a more stable trajectory since 2014.

Furthermore, debt payments (including capital and interests) rose more than seven times from 2009 (one of its lowest levels) to 2017 (its peak). The considerable increase in debt payments illustrates the difficult path public finances took. Given the economic context, in early 2021, the state of Ecuadorian public finances required a reform—this shaped Guillermo Lasso’s first months in power. The following section discusses who won the elections (Guillermo Lasso) and how his Administration has endeavoured to take on the required reforms.

Legislative Composition

While CREO could secure the Presidency, the party only achieved 9% of legislative seats. Correa-supported UNES won 36% of the seats, obtaining the plurality of the seats but falling short of a majority (with or without a coalition). As mentioned in the introduction, executives without legislative majorities (and often unable to build one) are not new to the Ecuadorian political system. Table 3 presents the final distribution of seats in the legislature. This highly fragmented National Assembly is reminiscent of the pre-2008 legislative compositions (see Table 4 ). For example, the PSC and ID achieved more seats in 2021 than in the last 15 years. PSC in 2006 got 13 seats (and subsequently had fewer seats in the following years). ID, in turn, achieved more seats than it had achieved since 1996. Nevertheless, not everything is reminiscent of old times. The number of Pachakutik’s legislators is a new achievement. Since its formation, the party held a maximum of 14 seats in 2002 (including seats achieved with electoral alliances) and a minimum of 4 seats in 2009 (Davila Gordillo 2021).

Legislative Dynamics and Conflict: the consequences of fragmented legislatures

For a generation of young voters, the current situation represents a stark contrast to the legislative majority that Rafael Correa’s party, Alianza Patria Altiva I Soberana (Alianza PAIS or AP), held between 2007 and 2017. For older voters, the legislature’s fragmentation is an unwelcomed deja-vu . The current legislative composition is reminiscent of when executives would rule without majority support (1979-2007). During that period, governments relied on shortlived coalitions (Mejía Acosta et al. 2008; ^{Mejía Acosta 2009} ) ³ and often faced institutional deadlocks ( ^{Conaghan 2003} ). As discussed in this section, this configuration and behavior were repeated in 2021.

To understand the challenging relationship between Lasso’s government and the fragmented legislatures, it is necessary first to discuss how the Ecuadorian legislature is set up. The legislative rules of the Ecuadorian National Assembly endow the largest party or coalitions with disproportional agenda-setting power ( ^{Cox 2006} ). As in most Latin American legislatures, members of the majority coalition can secure important legislative posts, e.g., the presidency of the legislature and committee chairpersonships. These posts allow them to restrict the policy options available to other assembly members. Majority coalitions can affect the type of legislation debated and, ultimately, voted on (Amorim Neto et al. 2003).

Procedural rules in the Ecuadorian Assembly push governments to build majority coalitions to expedite and control legislative work. CREO, as expected, tried to build a coalition to ensure the control of those critical positions. However, building these coalitions has proven difficult. The natural ally of CREO is the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC). This traditionally conservative party gained 10% of the seats, campaigned with Lasso, and located itself at the extreme of the anti-Correa camp. However, the two parties had an early fallout. PSC proposed a majority coalition with UNES to secure leadership (gate-keeping) positions within the National Assembly at the beginning of the term (e.g., president of the Assembly, committee chairs). This proposed coalition fell through but had important effects on forming a legislative coalition: the ideal partners (CREO and PSC) were no longer an option.

Lasso and its party had an alternative option. The party campaigned on an anticorreísmo platform rather than a policy-oriented platform (Abad ^{Cisneros et al. 2021} ). This strategy, in theory, opened the door to coalitions with parties that located themselves within this camp. All other legislative blocks holding more than ten seats situated themselves as part of the anti-correa camp during the electoral campaign. In theory, this opened up the doors for CREO – located at the extreme of the anti-Correa continuum – to build working coalitions with those within the camp. However, while anticorreísmo was a meeting point, the unlikely partners, such as Pachakutik and Izquierda Democrática, had different policy preferences. For example, the market liberalization goals espoused by CREO contradicted the policy position of Pachakutik. Thus, governing coalitions amongst the anticorreísmo camp were difficult and unstable, but not entirely impossible.

After CREO’s fallout with PSC, the government party tried a more unlikely coalition with center-left party Izquierda Democrática (ID) and the second-largest left-leaning party Pachakutik (PK). The agreement between the three parties was short-lived. It lasted enough for CREO to garner the votes necessary to secure a post at the Consejo de Administración Legislativa⁴ and three chairpersonships. However, the biggest winners were PK and ID. PK obtained the presidency of the Assembly, the chairpersonship of the Committee of Economic Regime, and the chairpersonship of four other committees. ID got one vice-presidency, the chairpersonship of the Justice Committee, the Security Committee, and the Health Committee.

On the whole, the fragmented legislature in 2021 presented multiple challenges to the ruling party. As table 4 shows, only one legislative block had a natural upper hand in forming a majority: UNES. However, as this pre-electoral coalition located itself within the pro-Correa camp, its possible partners were scarce. Thus, even though UNES was the largest party in 2021, it did not count on legislative allies during the initial allocation of critical appointments in the legislature. Arguably, this was due to the polarizing 12 years of correísmo , which meant parties were unwilling to join forces with them (of course, PSC was an exception during the early days of the legislature). As 2021 drew to a close, it was clear that UNES could not translate its relative electoral success into a commensurate power in the National Assembly. In turn, the government found itself with only a minority legislative coalition, Bancada del Acuerdo Nacional (BAN). ⁵

Policymaking in a fragmented field

Both the presidency and the positions of chairs grant gatekeeping power in the National Assembly. For example, while there is a technical committee in charge of suggesting the topic and the legal merits of a bill, it is ultimately the discretion of the president to determine whether to assign them to a committee or not. Once assigned, rules require committees to debate all bills. However, committee presidents can always delay debates indefinitely ( cajonear ) ( ^{Vallejo Vera 2021} ). Hence, the short-lived agreement allowed the National Assembly to start working – with positions allocated. However, it also left the president’s party with limited agenda-setting power.

At the same time, UNES has benefited from the size of its legislative block in one crucial aspect. UNES has become a reactive player within a fragmented legislature, unstable coalitions, and leadership positions distributed among opposing political parties. UNES legislative block’s size serves as a potential hurdle to advancing bills proposed by the executive. Specific bills requiring qualified majorities, such as partially vetoed bills or Constitutional amendments, would need the support of UNES. Hence, UNES has been able to negotiate piecemeal deals with the executive when it sees fit. One illustrative example of this behavior was the debate over a tributary reform sent by the executive in the category of an urgent economic bill (see Section 5.3). Urgent economic bills require the legislature to debate and vote on the bill in less than 30 days. Suppose the bill is not approved or archived with a majority of the votes. In that case, the executive can publish the bill through the Ministry of Law. The controversial bill, framed by the executive as part of Lasso’s campaign promises, was opposed by PSC, ID, PK, and UNES. Given the political climate, the legislature was likely to kill the bill. However, after various drafts, committee debates, and the eventual splitting up of the bill, members from UNES abstained from voting. The bill was never going to be approved. Nevertheless, the political maneuver from UNES allowed the president to publish the bill through the Ministry of Law.

We discuss in more detail the ramifications of the executive-legislative relations in the next section.

Beyond these temporary agreements, CREO has been unable to create a governing coalition. CREO has turned to “independent” legislators from diverse backgrounds (local political movements and party switchers) to form a legislative coalition (National Accord Caucus – BAN). This makeshift (and shaky) coalition barely includes 20% of legislative seats. It has little consequential legislative power without the other parties in the Assembly. ⁶ Ultimately, CREO can only rely on ad hoc agreements, ⁷ costly pork-barreling, and executive powers to advance policy proposals. We discuss this in the next section.

Nevertheless, the Ecuadorian Constitution gives ample legislative powers to the president. ⁸ Thus, it is crucial to analyze Lasso’s legislative activity in terms of executive-legislative relations. Different threads of academic literature can help frame the legislative politics of Lasso’s first few months in office. Research suggests that a presidential regime with proportional representation is prone to tensions and political gridlock ( ^{Mainwaring and Shugart 1997} ). In a fragmented legislature and limited party presence (Lasso’s party holds less than 10% of seats), a President could rely on his institutional powers to push for legislation ( ^{Morgenstern and Nacif 2002} ). As Sections 5.2 and 5.3 describe, Lasso used his prerogative to send economically urgent bills to shape the legislative agenda. Lasso sent three bills to Congress from May through December 2021. Two of them were economically urgent bills, but only one was approved. Lasso has used this strategy proportionally more than Correa and Lenin Moreno during their first years in power. Correa, in 2009, did not send any economically urgent bills, and in 2013 he sent two (out of a total of 11 proposed bills during his first twelve months in office). Lenin Moreno, in turn, sent two economically urgent bills (out of 7, within the same timeframe).

Another way to frame Ecuador’s executive-legislative relation is to use the Presidential Toolbox concept. This approach proposes that presidents have access to various tools that they can use to push legislation: institutional powers, cabinet positions, partisan strength, fiscal strength, and informal institutions (Chaisty et al. 2012; 2018). We know that in the past, executive-legislative relations were shaped by the fiscal context in which presidents operate ( ^{Aldaz Peña 2021} ). Nevertheless, this tool might not be fully available for President Lasso, given the fiscal constraints. The following section discusses how Lasso tried to push economic reforms and how his low partisan strength, inability to build a formal and stable coalition and the country’s fiscal conditions shaped his actions.

Economic Reforms: The First Attempt

Lasso’s Government aimed to pass a comprehensive economic reform with two main objectives: fiscal and productive. In the fiscal arena, the president wanted a tax reform that could increase income taxes, especially at the right tail of the income distribution. A tax increase would have reduced the persistent fiscal deficit. Importantly, this was part of Ecuador’s agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). To address the concerns of the productive sector, the reform also aimed to provide more flexibility to the labor market (e.g., allowing fixed-term contracts, extending the working week, and limiting the formation of unions). The attempt failed.

In September 2021, the president sent a bill proposal to the Assembly (Ley Orgánica Creando Oportunidades) . Lasso sent the bill as an economically urgent proposal, a presidential prerogative that shapes the timing of the decision-making process. The Ecuadorian Constitution and the Organic Law of the Legislative Function state that presidents can present to congress economically urgent proposals. The Assembly, in turn, has to vote on the bill within thirty days; otherwise, the bill automatically becomes a law. However, while an economically urgent bill can increase its probability of approval, the reforms presented by Lasso were not politically feasible. The progressive income tax rate should have resonated with center and left-of-center parties (e.g., ID, Pachakutik, UNES). Nevertheless, it brought up opposition across the political spectrum. Most legislators openly opposed the tax reform, arguing a defense of the middle class.

We can compare Lasso’s planned reform to attempts carried out by the previous presidents. Lenin Moreno, Lasso’s predecessor, decided to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies in 2019. While this reform did not require congressional approval, it sparked widespread opposition in the streets. Two days after the announcement, the Unión de Transportistas (Transportation Union) declared a strike. The Confederation of Indigenous Nations of Ecuador (CONAIE), the largest indigenous organization in Ecuador, followed suit soon after. After three weeks of confrontation, the president had to step back and opt for a less ambitious reduction of subsidies ( ^{Olivares and Medina 2020} ). By contrast, Rafael Correa increased tax revenues by increasing the value-added tax rate by two points, and by creating a one-off contribution from the net worth of the country’s largest firms and contributions from workers’ salaries. This was carried out after the 2016 earthquake. Despite the increase in the overall tax burden, Correa was able to push these changes, partly thanks to the qualified majority his party had in the legislature ( ^{Meléndez and Moncagatta 2017} ). These two cases exemplify the challenges of pushing difficult economic reforms in Ecuador and the importance of the control of the legislature.

Lasso also attempted to reform Ecuador’s Labor Code. He did not succeed. Legislators argued that such reforms would undercut labor rights. On September 29, only a few days after receiving the proposal, the Consejo de Administración Legislativa returned the proposal to the president. The Council argued that the bill contained different policy areas, something that is not constitutionally allowed. Since this relatively comprehensive bill did not succeed, Lasso was forced to adopt a less ambitious objective, splitting the bill into smaller reforms.

Political Support for Economic Reforms

Lasso has nonetheless found ways to pass some legislation playing up his executive powers and also finding himself with strange bedfellows. Lasso managed to approve his original public budget by leveraging his executive powers. The Assembly made several observations and significant suggestions to the budget proposal received. Legislators suggested increases to the budget of the Ministries of Health and Education; however, the executive did not include these changes. While the Assembly insisted on them, the president got away with the original budget version, given the limited budget prerogatives of the legislature. According to Ecuador’s Constitution and public finance laws, the president may or may not include congressional observations in the budget. Lasso opted to follow the latter and passed the initially proposed budget. This decision came at a cost: mainly limiting and undermining his relationship with parties in the legislature.

Trying to push for the tax reform, Lasso found support in what perhaps was the least likely group. Lasso sent another economically urgent proposal in October 2021. The proposal included an increase in the income tax rate and a reduction in tax deductions. The reform also included a tax on individuals with a net worth higher than one million dollars. The government expected to collect approximately USD 950 million per year, which would benefit public finances but not lead to a positive fiscal balance. The legislature’s Economic Committee produced two reports for the house to vote on. On the last day of the allowed period, legislators voted on the report produced by the committee instead of the bill itself. The alternative to the president’s bill did not reach a majority of votes thanks to the abstention of UNES. While UNES distanced itself from the bill, Lasso’s tax reform came into place ultimately thanks to the correísmo .

The new tax reforms will likely impact at least two political fronts: the government and the correísmo . ⁹ For the government, the tax reform represents having a line of communication open with IFIs and access to their resources. Increasing tax revenues in 2022 was one of the agreements signed by Ecuador and the IMF. While the government has faced difficulties following many conditions of the agreement, it has been able to hit some targets while continuing to have IFIs support. This ensures access to additional resources in the following years.

Further, it means potentially - lower financial costs if the country opts to issue sovereign bonds in the future. The Ministry of Finance has been able to find a complex equilibrium balancing weak support for their fiscal plan, opposition from most parties and former allies (business leaders), and a continuing negotiation with IFIs.

UNES’ silent support for Lasso’s reform can have further implications for the correísmo . Within and outside the c orreísmo , many critical voices condemned UNES’ actions in the legislature. Former Correa supporters publicly voiced their opposition to UNES legislative behavior. Within what many considered a united front, these differences suggest the beginning of more profound changes within the party (e.g., the possible formation of factions). These divisions will likely become more visible during the 2023 local elections. We might still be far from asserting that a dislocation occurred in the party system ( ^{Roberts 2002} ). However, it seems reasonable that the government’s need to push for economic reforms and its strategies – securing support from unexpected partners – could re-shape the allegiances that voters showed in 2021. As left-of-center parties support part or some of Lasso’s policy agenda, their voters might leave them.

Vaccination, Penitentiary Crisis, and Other 2021 Issues

One of the key actions that Lasso successfully pursued was the vaccination of the Ecuadorian population. The first shipment of COVID-19 vaccines arrived in Ecuador during the height of the 2021 electoral campaign on January 21. The arrival of a small box with 8000 doses (enough only for 4000 people) caused indignation amongst the population. Lenin Moreno’s administration started its vaccine rollout with a small number of doses. Shortly after the program’s start, a series of complaints suggested a possible influence-peddling case on the first vaccination list. The scandal, called “vaccinated VIPs,” included the mother of the then-Minister of Health, several public figures, and the Rotary Club members. By the end of Moreno’s term (May 2021), less than 500 thousand Ecuadorians were fully immunized, and the president left with only 4% of approval. Lasso and his followers used the issue to both criticize the outgoing government and frame the actions of his future administration: immunization was the first step towards the reactivation of the economy.

The “Vaccination Plan 9/100” began in June when 57% of the population considered Lasso’s Administration to be good or very good (The Americas Baromenter ^{LAPOP 2021} ). The government met its vaccination goal by September. Thanks to a collaborative approach that included social organizations, the private sector, and international cooperation, the vaccination rollout was fast and efficient. These public and private actors were fundamental blocks for vaccine purchasing, vaccination logistics, and promotion. As Cyr, Bianchi, and Gonzalez (2021) show, in Latin America, collaborative governance strategies where the national government included other actors as key to the contention of the pandemic have been more successful than those that only used State capacity. Ecuador is an example of such a case.

The implementation of this policy reduced social anxieties regarding the pandemic. Public opinion surveys carried out between December 2020 and February 2021 showed that the vast majority of Ecuadorians (70% and 96%, respectively) disapproved of Moreno’s performance during the pandemic and were very dissatisfied with the health system’s capacity to deal with the sanitary crisis (Abad Cisneros 2021; Castellanos ^{Santamaría et al. 2021} ). However, by September 2021, 96.3% of the population considered that the vaccination pace was “good” or “very good,” 74% approved Lasso’s government, and 59% thought that the country was going in the “right way” ( ^{CEDATOS 2021} ).

The government tried to capitalize on the success of the vaccine program rollout. All official communication channels emphasized how the “government of unity ( gobierno del encuentro )” managed to put forth an ambitious, efficient, and “transcendental” initiative that would open the door for economic reactivation. However, Lasso’s public support was rapidly undermined. Problems in the Public Health System, namely shortages of medicines, delays in payment to suppliers, and budgetary issues with the Ecuadorian Social Security Institute, started affecting the most vulnerable population. These problems showed that despite the successful vaccine program, structural issues of the Ecuadorian health system remained unattended.

Although not necessarily involving the executive, corruption scandals damaged the image of all politicians and public servants. During the sanitary emergency, several legislators and government officials were involved in corruption networks related to the construction of public hospitals, and overpriced sanitary supplies (Abad Cisneros 2021; Castellanos ^{Santamaría et al. 2021} ). In December 2020, there were reports of at least 196 open cases for bribery, embezzlement, and organized crime ( ^{El Comercio 2021} ). 2021 was no exception. The Attorney General’s office investigated five corruption plots involving public servants from the Comptroller General, the Police, Petroecuador, and other public institutions ( ^{Primicias 2022} ). According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, in 2021, the country ranked 105 among 180 evaluated countries, while in 2020, it ranked 92.

Finally, the worsening of the prison system crisis highlighted the government’s slow reaction, lack of experience, and inability to handle pressing issues and structural deficiencies. In 2018 human rights organizations acknowledged a crisis in the Ecuadorian Penitentiary System. According to the Permanent Human Rights Committee in 2018 and 2019, prisons represented a considerable risk for those deprived of liberty. The organization denounced acute overcrowding, acts of extreme violence, and torture inside the country’s most important detention facilities (CDH 2019). The situation exploded on February 23, 2021, with the assassination of 79 inmates during riots that occurred in the penitentiaries of Guayaquil, Cuenca, and Latacunga, which “host 70 percent of Ecuador’s prison population” ( ^{Vivanco 2021} ).

Lasso did not put actions toward the jails at the center of his work. This was not entirely unexpected as even though the February events took place after the presidential first round, the problem did not reach the center of the electoral agenda. Security was not a prominent issue among the leading candidates during the 2021 electoral campaign. CREO, UNES, Pachakutik, and ID programs focused mainly on education, economics, health, and social justice. Further, Lasso’s inaugural address did not mention internal security or the Penitentiary System.

In July 2021, another penitentiary riot took place, leaving 22 inmates dead. Lasso declared a state of emergency within the prison’s perimeter. The decree allowed the mobilization of military personnel to control the violent actions of criminal organizations related to drug trafficking. According to the government, these organizations were fighting for prison control ( ^{Maydeu-Olivares 2021} ; ^{Vivanco 2021} ). The state of emergency proved insufficient. The government faced similar episodes in September, October, and November, thus challenging its capacity to maintain order.

In November, the National Assembly unanimously approved a report on the situation of the penitentiary system. The document recognized that the penitentiary population surpassed the installed capacity by 40%. The system was not complying with international standards regarding detainee care, such as separation of inmates according to age, type of crime or security levels. It concluded that Ecuador did not have a criminal policy with a human rights approach ( ^{El Universo 2022} ). The year ended with a general escalation of violence: official records registered the assassination of 300 inmates and more than 2000 homicides, twice the number registered in 2019 ( ^{El Universo 2022} ). In response to the situation, the government expanded the state of emergency to various provinces. It also established an international Pacification Commission and proposed a national security bill widening the scope of action of the police and the military.

Human Rights activists and organizations pointed to the reactive nature of these initiatives. They emphasized the measures did not address the main problems of the penitentiary system. According to the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, Ecuador’s “highly punitive war on drugs, insufficient budget and personnel, absence of appropriate statistics, inadequate separation of inmates,” along with the violent confrontation between rival criminal gangs are the factors exacerbating the problems within the detention centers ( ^{OHCHR 2021} ).

By December 2021, only 38% of Ecuadorians from the four major cities (Quito, Guayaquil, Manta, and Cuenca) considered that the government was doing a “good” or a “very good” job ( ^{Perfiles de Opinión 2022} ). This significant decline in citizens’ satisfaction with the government pointed to the end of a relatively short (barely six months long) honeymoon. At the same time, there was a change in the official discourse regarding executive-legislative relations. In September, the president publicly stated that he would call for a Constitutional Referendum if the National Assembly blocked governmental initiatives. In October, he refused to clear his involvement with the Pandora Papers in the plenary of the Assembly. Lasso’s attitude towards the legislature changed once more in December. As we explained in previous sections, after the National Assembly denied the government’s first economic attempt at reform (Ley Creando Oportunidades), the president was forced to comply and seek support inside the legislature.