Abstract

CASALES GARCIA, Roberto. Apperception and conscientia in Leibniz’s monadological ontology. Veritas [online]. 2019, n.43, pp.49-67. ISSN 0718-9273.  http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-92732019000200049.

The main aim of this article is to analyze Leibniz’s distinction between sensitive apperception and ‘conscientia’ through his monadological ontology, with the intention of lighten the constitutive differences between the three types of monads that Leibniz state, that is, between bare monads, souls and spirits. By proving this, my approach not only argues against the standard conceptions of Leibniz's notion of apperception, which ends attributing apperception only to the specify case of spirits, but it abo places the Hanoverian proposal between two contemporary lectures: on one side, an approach that understand apperception as a high order reflexive act, that is, a perception of a perception; on the other side, an approach that distinguishes sensible apperception from ‘conscientia’ in order to privilege a first order theory for the first one, reserving the reflective acts only for the second. Even when the textual evidence is closer to the last one, there are some elements of the first approach that allow us to improve it.

Keywords : Perception; appetite; apperception/ consciousness; sensation; Leibniz.

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