Resumen

FORTEZA, Álvaro  y  NOBOA, Cecilia. Tolerance of noncompliance: Discretion rather than simple rules?. Estudios de Economía [online]. 2019, vol.46, n.1, pp.31-59. ISSN 0718-5286.  http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-52862019000100031.

We argue that societies sometimes choose not to enforce the law to gain “flexibility”. Especially developing countries face a dilemma between discretion and commitment to only partially-contingent rules. Rules are good for incentives, but discretion may be more “flexible”. We embed this dilemma in a political model and show that citizens will not support strong enforcement institutions unless the state is able to commit to sufficiently sophisticated redistributive policies.

Palabras clave : Discretion; commitment; simple rules; informality; enforcement; JEL Classification: D71, D81, E26, O17.

        · resumen en Español     · texto en Inglés     · Inglés ( pdf )