Resumen

HAMOUDI, Hamid; RODRIGUEZ, Isabel  y  MARTIN-BUSTAMANTE, Marcos Sanz. Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation. Estudios de Economía [online]. 2017, vol.44, n.1, pp.33-51. ISSN 0718-5286.  http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-52862017000100033.

This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium outcome is then found for both spatial configurations. When the regulator is inclined to favor consumers (consumer-oriented) both firms are restricted to locate at one point to serve the whole market. Nevertheless, when the preferences of the regulator are biased towards firms (firm-oriented) the zoning area is maximized, with both firms being located at the market boundaries. The equilibrium outcome confirms location patterns found in real life situations under a non-neutral regulator.

Palabras clave : Zoning; spatial competition; welfare function; equilibrium results; industrial policy..

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