SciELO - Scientific Electronic Library Online

 
vol.41 número2Determinación del riesgo de fracaso financiero mediante la utilización de modelos paramétricos, de inteligencia artificial, y de información de auditoría índice de autoresíndice de assuntospesquisa de artigos
Home Pagelista alfabética de periódicos  

Serviços Personalizados

Journal

Artigo

Indicadores

Links relacionados

  • Em processo de indexaçãoCitado por Google
  • Não possue artigos similaresSimilares em SciELO
  • Em processo de indexaçãoSimilares em Google

Compartilhar


Estudios de economía

versão On-line ISSN 0718-5286

Resumo

PAREDES, Ricardo D; CRISOSTO K, Andrés  e  MARTI C, Philippe. Judicial versus Private Auctions: Better without Protection?Remates judiciales versus privados: ¿Mejor sin protección?. Estudios de Economía [online]. 2014, vol.41, n.2, pp.171-186. ISSN 0718-5286.  http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-52862014000200001.

Using a sample of 680 and 1,300 judicial and private auctions respectively, we analyze the effect on the wealth of those the law is intended to protect of different regulations applicable to each type of auctions. We find that consistent with a simple economic model, Courts assign judicial auctions in a discretional manner, and that the assigned auctioneers charge fees which are substantially higher than those allowed by law. While this behavior put the intended protection to debtor and creditor at risk, economic theory does not rule out a welfare enhancing effect. We test the hypothesis that the judicial auctions' design reduces the welfare of those intended to protect and, consistent with the predictions of our model, we find it is more likely for Courts to appoint the less effective auctioneers and that the net price received by creditors and debtors in judicial auctions is about 18% to 33% below those that could be obtained in private auctions.

Palavras-chave : Auctions; regulation; efficiency.

        · resumo em Espanhol     · texto em Inglês     · Inglês ( pdf )

 

Creative Commons License Todo o conteúdo deste periódico, exceto onde está identificado, está licenciado sob uma Licença Creative Commons