Resumen

MENDEZ NAYA, José. PRIVATIZATION AND MERGERS IN MIXED OLIGOPOLY MODELS. Estudios de Economía [online]. 2007, vol.34, n.1, pp.37-52. ISSN 0718-5286.  http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-52862007000100003.

The aim of this paper is to complement the existing literature on horizontal mergers, by setting a Cournot mixed oligopoly model. Specifically, the merger paradox is qualified by proving that a merger could be profitable for the merging firms even if it does not include most market firms. Furthermore, it is proved that a merger can only be welfare improving if the degree of privatization of the public firm is low enough

Palabras clave : mixed oligopoly; privatization; mergers.

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