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Revista de filosofía

On-line version ISSN 0718-4360

Abstract

REINEL SANCHEZ, José. DAVID HUME, LA IMPOSIBILIDAD DE UN PROGRESO EN LOS SENTIMIENTOS MORALES. Rev. filos. [online]. 2012, vol.68, pp.115-132. ISSN 0718-4360.  http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-43602012000100009.

This essay brings up the extent of David Hume's moral proposal; specifically, the idea that facing the impossibility of accomplish sincere moral aims the individual is left to feign that such sentiments have been acquired. Such attitude is seen by the philosopher as favourable for proper social relations andfor the shaping of coexistence agreements amongst possessive selfish individuals. Nevertheless, given such radical determinism of the mind conceived by Hume, the effort would remark only the attempts to team up with for reaching peaceful solutions for the problems of unsociability but would not have real effects over the original passions of the individuals.

Keywords : morality; the mind as a theatre; determinism; sympathy; Progress of sentiments; feign.

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