A tribute to Jonathan Haidt

Odio e ira: análisis conceptual y efectos prácticos. Un tributo a Jonathan Haidt

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Abstract  
This work intends to study the status of some emotions in a practical environment. I shall focus specifically on two: anger and hatred. My first objective will be to show that the distinction between the two is not as simple as might appear at first sight. This is because, as I will show, anger and hatred appear to be neighboring emotions. It is therefore necessary to analyze them conceptually to pull aside the veils of appearance and thus identify their relevant differences. My second objective is to show that the conceptual distinction I seek is not in pursuit of a merely analytical interest. I shall claim that the conceptual differences here have a practical impact, especially in the political environment, because anger and hatred should be dealt with differently in the realm of democracies.

Keywords: emotions, hatred, anger, conceptual analysis, practical effects.

Resumen  
Este trabajo estará centrado en estudiar el estatus que algunas emociones tienen en el ámbito práctico. Concretamente me detendré en dos de ellas: la ira y el odio. Mi primer objetivo será mostrar que distinguir entre ambas no resulta tan simple como a primera vista pudiese juzgarse. Esto porque, como mostrare, la ira y el odio parecen emociones vecinas. Por lo tanto, es necesario analizarlas conceptualmente para rasgar los velos de la apariencia y, en consecuencia, para identificar sus diferencias relevantes. Mi segundo objetivo será mostrar que la distinción conceptual que busco no persigue un interés...
meramente analítico. Sostendré que las diferencias conceptuales en esta oportunidad tienen impacto práctico, especialmente en el ámbito político porque la ira y el odio son y deben ser administradas de manera diferente en el terreno de las democracias.

**Palabras clave:** emociones, odio, ira, análisis conceptual, efectos prácticos.

1. Introduction

Some anniversaries express more than just a mere counting of years passed. Some are significant because they make it possible for us to value facts with certain significance. In this case, an intellectual fact linked to the publication of an important paper in the domain of moral psychology. Indeed, in this special issue, the *Humanities Journal of Valparaíso* is celebrating the fact that two decades have passed since the date of publication of Professor Jonathan Haidt's text *The emotional dog and its rational tail* (2001, 814-834).

This work by Haidt has made many contributions, not just to moral psychology, but to moral philosophy in particular. As an example, his work indicates that emotions do not always lack some class of cognitive status. That is why his work might be a partial rebuttal of classical forms of emotivism such as Ayer's (for more contemporary and sophisticated versions of “neo-emotivism,” see, for example, Gibbard 1990). Secondly, and not wishing to minimize his contributions, his work helps to understand that if there are “moral facts,” they cannot be independent of the beliefs and wishes of moral agents. This independence is part of a Platonic conception that becomes “naturalized” by Haidt, that is, filtered by a more empirical view of the moral world. That is why I believe the objectivity of the moral judgment depends, for Haidt, either on quick and correct perceptions of an evaluative nature of the action or character, or the slower argumentation that the “moral mind” uses in cases that are more debatable – from the point of view of perception – or difficult to resolve. In other words, for Haidt, it would be possible to talk about two mental systems: one with a quick response, through perceptions, which lack inferential features, and another slower one, through the well-known idea of “moral reasoning.” The dog is emotional in the first response, and rational in the second. One could criticize Haidt’s proposal for being another disguised form of Cartesianism, of substance dualism (one operating fast, the other acting more slowly). Nevertheless, Haidt stresses an idea opposed to Cartesian dualism and it is that

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1 In this work I do not become involved in the topic of the different meanings the word “cognitive” has in relation to emotions. I shall only indicate that cognitive versions of the emotions may present themselves in several ways; for example, some may be more propositional, others more computational, others may focus on the nature of moral judication, etc.

2 Another way of putting it, as one of the anonymous reviewers of this paper stated, would be that Haidt “emphasizes the fact that the causal factor that triggers moral judgments is primarily emotional, and that reason only intervenes *a posteriori*, upon seeking arguments that justify a judgment of moral decision, but for Haidt it was not those rational arguments that actually triggered the judgment, but certain emotional intuitions.” The quote I just made is so precise that I allowed myself to transcribe it literally.
there are closer ties between the mind (reasoning, slow response) and the body (perception, quick corporal and emotional response). Such ties need to be conceptually modeled to understand the more complex interactions between reason and emotion, mind and body. At any rate, I do not intend to go into this any further. Let it suffice to point out that Professor Haidt’s work, along with that of other moral psychologists (Damasio 2013; Doris 2010; Greene 2014), and neuroethicists (Migallón Granados and Giménez Amaya 2009; Farah 2010; González Lagier 2017; Vidiella 2018), is more useful for understanding the role of emotions in practical reasoning, in motivation, in decision, etc.

It is because of what I have just mentioned that my tribute to Haidt in this paper intends to study the status of some emotions in a practical environment. I shall focus specifically on two: anger and hatred. My first objective will be to show that the distinction between the two is not as simple as might appear at first sight. This is because, as I will show, anger and hatred appear to be neighboring emotions. It is therefore necessary to analyze them conceptually to pull aside the veils of appearance and thus identify their relevant differences. My second objective is to show that the conceptual distinction I seek is not in pursuit of a merely analytical interest. I shall claim that the conceptual differences here have a practical impact, especially in the political environment, because anger and hatred should be dealt with differently in the realm of democracies.

My contribution will be structured as follows. In section 2 I will present a brief conceptual genealogy of anger and hatred in the general philosophical tradition. In section 3 I will pose some problems that exist in the conceptual distinction between anger and hatred. In section 4 I translate the earlier analytical discussion, evaluating some of its practical effects in the political terrain, characteristic of democratic systems. I will use some examples to do this. I should clarify that I assume a basic comprehension of what using the word democracy involves and I do not dwell on definitions of this term. What is more, I am not obsessed in this paper with distinguishing different democratic regimes; rather I take for granted a generalized intuitive idea of what living in democracy involves. Lastly, in the final considerations, in section 5, I sum up the work.

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3 Strictly speaking, in current cognitive psychology, all processes are assumed to be cognitive, and Haidt himself claims that intuitive processes and deliberative processes differ only in the speed at which they occur. As one of the anonymous reviewers has reminded me, and here I allow myself to quote literally, “intuition is triggered automatically, mediated by emotional components that lead to an immediate assessment of the situation, while deliberative processes are the product of an explicit reflection in which we bring the mental processes that triggered the intuitive emotional judgment into our consciousness.”
2. A brief conceptual genealogy of anger and hatred

It is necessary to banish the idea that the topic of emotions is only of interest to contemporary analytical philosophy. The point of emotions has always interested a variety of philosophers from widely differing traditions. I will assume here that it was Aristotle who laid down one of the first definitions of anger. In *Rhetoric*, he states:

Let anger be desire, involving pain, for apparent revenge, because of apparent contempt on the part of someone unfit to treat the person himself, or one of those close to him, with contempt… and all anger must entail some sort of pleasure, namely, the one from the hope of being revenged (2018, 56 [1378b]).

With respect to the classes of slight, Aristotle particularly regarded disparagement, vexation and outrage. I will not dwell on definitions of these classes, I will appeal to the readers’ general intuitive comprehension.

There is a very long and varied philosophical tradition that deals with enunciating the observable corporal features of emotions in general (Vendrell Ferrán 2009, 217-240). Anger is no exception. Following Juvenal, Montaigne (2002, 522), for example, describes it by stating: “(...) enflammés de colère, ils s’emportent comme un roc détaché de la montagne roule du sommet sur la pente.”

Back to Aristotle who, in *Rhetoric*, 1382a, conceptually differentiates anger from hatred in two features: while anger is directed to the particulars, as against Callias or Socrates, hatred is also against kinds. On the other hand, Aristotle mentions a second feature, since anger “is curable in time, whereas the latter [hatred] is not curable.”

From this last remark of Aristotle’s, it would seem that anger and hatred can indeed be clearly distinguished conceptually. Anger is only directed at the particular, while hatred “also” at kinds. And also anger can be cured by time, but hatred, and Aristotle is decisive on this aspect, “cannot be cured.” That is to say, it is the nearest thing there is to a pure moral vice or a form of moral bestiality like those that intrigued Aristotle.

This paper, however, is not an attempt at philology of the classic texts of Aristotle or Montaigne. Mentioning an ancient author and a modern one seeks to indicate that the topic of emotions, and of anger or of hatred, has concerned philosophers for ages. For example, in the phenomenological tradition of the 20th century, Aurel Kolnai (2013) claims that hatred is a kind of sentiment that can be labeled as “hostile,” as it separates the hating individual from the moral community as a whole. According to Kolnai, hatred shares this feature with other two emotions: with arrogance (because the arrogant person feels superior to...) and with disgust (because certain people feel phobias or strong aversions to others).

In the analytical tradition, using the last expression in a broader sense, Martha Nussbaum (2018) has written a specific work, *Anger and forgiveness*, in which she examines this emotion’s conceptual features, as are its normative problems. Marginaly, she differentiates anger from other emotions like projective disgust and hatred. While in anger, she says, the focus is on the
action and not on the person with whom one feels angry, in the case of hatred, instead, says Nussbaum, the person’s “globality” is detested. In some measure, the expression “globality” is close to Aristotle’s idea that he who hates also directs himself against “kinds” of people.

So far it may not be possible to understand why I have stated that anger and hatred are neighboring emotions. And why, therefore, have I said that it is not so easy to find relevant differences? The examples from Aristotle, Montaigne or Nussbaum discredit my claim. What is more, natural languages often use different words for anger and hatred, respectively. We have the word ANGER (in English), we have IRA (in Spanish), WUT (in German) and COLÈRE (in French). In the case of the word HATRED (in English), we have the term ODIO (in Spanish), HASS (in German) and Haine (in French).

Nevertheless, any moderately informed philosopher knows that words and concepts should not be confused. Words are a starting point, not a finishing line. That is why the clear linguistic distinction is not necessarily accompanied by a clear conceptual distinction. It is upon seeing some of the problems I come across in distinguishing – on a stable basis – between the concepts of anger and hatred that I can account for my initial statement. As I have already pointed out, these differences may have translations or practical effects that I will explain more thoroughly in the fourth section.

3. Some conceptual problems with respect to the distinction between anger and hatred

The main problem in conceptually distinguishing between the emotion of anger and that of hatred is that they are “neighbors.” With this colloquial expression I seek to draw attention to the fact that they appear to share some common conceptual features and that these features have phenomenical manifestations in the world. To be in a position to appreciate this proximity it is necessary to say something about hatred. This is because I referred briefly in the foregoing section to the concept of anger and my annotations on hatred have been indirect.

According to Carolin Emcke (2019, 20), he who hates “fabricates his object.” To say this in a manner similar to what Emcke poses, a philosopher like Pfänder (quoted by Kolnai 2013, 153, footnote 7), who belongs to the old phenomenology, claims that emotions like hatred are not only directed towards their object, they also emanate from the subject towards the object. Remember too that Aristotle, in distinguishing anger from hatred, stated that the

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4 In response to a comment from one of the anonymous reviewers of this paper, it is worth clarifying that, perhaps, speaking in greater detail, one might distinguish between two types of globality. In the paradigmatic case of ‘just anger,’ this emotion may also presuppose that it is linked with kinds or classes: for example, feeling anger about the corruption of the “political class.” In the case of ‘hatred,’ the notion of class or kind, that is, of globality, does not prevent something empirically obvious: that hatred is aimed at specific particulars who “represent” the global features of a class or kind: for example, when transsexuals or feminists are hated.

5 Of course, this assumption I adopt from Emcke, Kolnai or Pfänder is conceptually acceptable if and only if
latter was also directed towards “kinds.” And that these kinds involve hating the “globality” of certain people, as claimed by Martha Nussbaum, quoted above. Hence the notion of kind here is identical to that of “class.” That is to say that he who hates directs his emotion towards “classes” of people, kinds of people, general features of a certain kind of people. To make the point clearer, I quote Adela Cortina (2017, 29) who, in her work Aporophobia, describes the phenomenon of hatred of the poor for having the features that the hater associates with the poor person: handicap, inferiority, etc. These features that generate hatred are part of the class of properties that the hater “projects” on the world. That is to say, they are schematizations, stereotypical attributions, applied to kinds or to particulars who belong to those kinds. They are perceptually distorted schematizations or rationalizations whose content becomes normatively inadmissible after an exhaustive examination using the tools of any form of critical or mature morality. I will assume that, in a mature morality, a minimally valid requirement should be that the pejorative rules that the hater projects onto his hate-objects apply to also to him. And this is something that, generally speaking, the hater cannot accept. Apart from the poor, among the genres, classes, types or groups recurrently hated are Jews, blacks, women, transsexuals, queers, certain migrants, etc.

I would like to pose the existence of conceptual features that make it possible to characterize hatred: on one hand, the goal, at least symbolic, of destroying the hated party on the grounds of what the hater embodies in terms of the kind to which he belongs; on the other, the absence of remorse, guilt or sorrow by the hater when he experiences the emotion of hatred. In fact, if social phenomena like hatred are observed, rarely does the hater apologize. In Rhetoric, Aristotle begins a long list of definitions of hatred that are generally shared by all the traditions. And he says (1990, 107) that he who has anger “feels sorrow, but not the hater.” The “destructive” feature of hatred is captured implicitly by Aristotle in the idea that he who hates also directs himself towards kinds. But Aristotle explicitly refers to the destructive
feature when he points out (1990, 107) that he who feels anger wishes to be paid back by the party he feels angry with; with respect to hatred – Aristotle says – the hater wishes the other party not to exist. That “other” is the hated party.

In sum, and once again according to Aristotle, in anger one feels the desire for revenge, which reports a certain remorse or sorrow, a pain in the soul. Once the object of the revenge has been satisfied, Aristotle believes, in a more empirical statement, that the anger “tends to relent.” Instead hatred, and I repeat with Aristotle, appears not to cease, “it has no cure.” Because, in other words, he who hates once and again, replaces his hate-objects in order to keep his emotion strong. Where hatred is concerned, on the other hand, Aristotle says, there is an absence of remorse or moral guilt, and the hater does not seek to satisfy a slight (outrage, vexation, humiliation, etc.) through revenge, but, strictly speaking, wishes the object to cease existing.

Aristotle, and all the definitional tradition shared by authors thousands of years hence, like Martha Nussbaum in *Anger and Forgiveness*, considers that anger and hatred can be clearly distinguished in the conceptual environment. Nevertheless, this is too simple to believe all at once.

Firstly, Aristotle acknowledges that anger is also accompanied by a “pleasure” motivated by the hope that the slight be “avenged.” And taking revenge is a type of action that can well be described with the purpose of causing harm to whoever perpetrated the slight, under whatever form the latter occurred. This seems to be the reason why anger and hate appear, after all, to be “neighboring” emotions. Because the desire for the hated party to be destroyed, even though the act itself does not take place, although it is symbolic, assumes the maximum damage: the suppression of human agents for being the type of people they are. What is more, for the sake of arguing that the hater does not experience guilt, it is possible to state by opposition that he feels a type of pleasure in machinating his hatred and expressing it.

I do believe, however, that this proximity referred to, which leads to part of the problem I am tackling in this paper, is only apparent. The basic cases of anger that we need to bear in mind, based on Aristotle’s definition, are those where slight is verified, an offence, an outrage, etc. That is to say that anger “does not fabricate its object” as Amcke metaphorically poses in relation to hatred. It does not project distorted images from the subject that hates towards the object, but rather ascertains, generally from what Haidt calls quick thought or perception, a “real” slight. The pleasure Aristotle refers to also links to the hope of obtaining satisfaction of seeing the slighting party suffering a just punishment. What is more, from Plato on, passing through the stoics and Montaigne, etc., there is generalized, though not unanimous, agreement that he who punishes “should punish without anger” (Acorn 2018).

Nevertheless we need to add an ulterior analytical complication to the basic cases of anger I have indicated, but one that is relatively easy to resolve. And it is that, as Martha Nussbaum (2018) explains, one thing is “status” anger, and another very different one is anger “for injustice.” So far I have had anger for injustice in mind, which is an anger that we could call
“just anger,” also within the Aristotelian corpus now taken in a lax sense. As it is just, such anger would nevertheless involve some frictions, compatible with the Aristotelian idea of virtue, now briefly understood as “excellence of character.” Instead, although widely found in our practices, anger for status, as Nussbaum argues, should be taken more seriously. For example, someone who becomes angry because his name is wrongly pronounced in a public event is not a virtuous subject and his anger is not just. Because the offense is against the self, considered a disproportionate ego. There is no injustice in the more objective sense that an act has occurred that is impermissible by mature morals, or by a more or less developed theory of justice.

I have said before that anger and hatred would be neighboring emotions only in an apparent sense. And therefore my problem is so far a pseudo-problem rather than a genuine one, although so dilated that it was worth dissolving. But perhaps there is an additional genuine problem that complicates the conceptual analysis. Let us see. I have claimed that the hater’s desire for destruction and the absence of guilt are conceptual features of hatred qua emotion. I have also indicated that the pleasurable desire to avenge a slight is a prominent feature of so-called just anger. However, should this class of feature be considered as appealing to an analytical recipe of necessary and sufficient conditions of application of the concepts of anger and hatred? My partial answer is yes, but maybe only for the “basic” (or purest) cases of hatred and anger. My reason for stating this is that the empirical world does not come classified beforehand. The particular facts of the world do not come easily labeled: this specific case is one of anger (with a notice indicating it as such), and that other case is a specific case of hatred (with a notice indicating it as such). Even though we buy into Kantian metaphysics and adopt the idea according to which we organize the world categorically, this world is made up of particulars that present themselves to us. And these particulars may be “mixes” of features of properties. That is why a follower of Wittgenstein’s, adopting the orientation of *Philosophical Investigations*, might think that the features I made reference to above in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions of application of the concepts are something else. Rather, such features should be understood in terms of “family similarities” as the particular cases in the world are mixes of features. What does cases with mixes of features mean? Basically it means the following: that, although there are basic or pure cases of anger and hatred, there are cases that result from a mix of properties. This is not unusual, Jon Elster (2013) himself has claimed that emotions form “alchemies,” that they are connected in different ways. For instance, other emotions may be at play behind hatred: extreme fear or phobia, for example, of transsexual subjects, or of Jews, or of homosexuals. Fear may also sometimes be derived from “projective” disgust. Disgust is projective insofar as we project the phobia against certain subjects by analogy in a slightly veiled or distorted way. For example, in Buenos Aires, some rich women are reluctant to share public transport with housemaids because they are disgusted by their smell. Smells of fecal matter, for example, are part of this “basic” type of disgust. As Nussbaum (2019) has explained, when we apply that aspect of our animality to others around us by analogy, it is a case of projective disgust.
Despite my advances on the philosophical board, I have not yet however managed to show the problem I wish to point out. And it is that, on some occasions, hatred may derive from anger. Sometimes from status anger, but also from just anger on occasion. It is possible to indicate that, just as there are basic cases of hatred (defined in the terms mentioned above), there are also less pure, or “derived,” cases. I am thinking in particular of those cases of hatred derived from initial anger. For instance, it is common for people to become angry about acts of corruption by public officials. They believe, and rightly so, that corruption is only a moral problem. It is also a problem of justice because there are subjects who, in obtaining benefits that do not correspond to their institutional position, place themselves above the law and equality. And this offends justice because, ultimately, not all citizens are treated equally. If this (just) anger, or this basic case of anger, is not treated over a certain period of time by, say, a political system like a democracy, it might derive into hatred. And when the angry become haters, it often means that they wish the political class to “disappear.”

A somewhat perspicacious person might now claim that what I called “apparent” proximity is in fact an error. Because there would be alchemy between just anger and its mutation into hatred in the derived sense. In the end, what we intended to keep separate, has become mixed up. Proximity returns. Nonetheless, I do not think this is necessarily the case. What has changed is that there are cases that start out as anger, that in the middle (to put it graphically) mix with other emotions, and end up being a basic case of “derived hatred.” The question that follows is whether it is valid to claim for this derived case that the hater also fabricates his object, as he did in the basic cases. The answer is somewhat complicated. In one sense I would say yes because what is now the hated party (the political class, for example) acquires exaggerated, partially distorted features in the hater’s mind. Hatred thrives on exaggerating features. That is how politicians appear to the hater in a derived sense as monsters, as people with nothing worthwhile, as people who have to be deleted or made to disappear. In another sense, however, it could be countered that hatred in the derived sense may preserve some of the cognitive elements of just anger. In which case the hatred is not fabricated, not entirely. Nevertheless, the trajectory between just anger and hatred is significant. Both Aristotle and currently Peter Sloterdijk (2017) claim that hatred requires “time.” Implicitly, the idea of a case in a derived sense is admitted: something begins with anger but, over time, mutates

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8 In fact, I find this to be a lucid observation of one of this paper’s anonymous reviewers when they defend the thesis according to which hate is, as is anger, a “retributive” emotion. I would agree with this statement simpliciter. As I have been arguing, what starts out as just anger can lead to hatred. Paradigmatically, when just and angry claims are not duly dealt with by democracies, people tend to accumulate loads of anger that may mutate into hatred. For example, if rapists are not punished, it is very likely that parents of raped daughters will no longer just feel anger and seek a just response from the State, but rather activate the idea of “taking the law into their own hands” as a result of hatred. As can be seen, I am simply describing a potential state of affairs. I do think, however, that according to my conceptual analysis, the hatred derived from just anger involves some serious normative problems. The intensity of hatred, along with the presupposition according to which the destruction of the other is sought, suggests that, contrary to just anger, hatred is already a form of moral vice. And this observation leads us beyond the philosophy of mind to questions of normative ethics.
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into hatred. One could add to this idea that anger is spontaneous, furious or rabid in the terms in which Juvenal defines it, and that hatred is cold, calculating. This seems to be old Plutarch’s idea (Ortiz Millán 2004, 33-56). However, when we observe rallies of haters in the streets, one might ascribe to them a spontaneity, a bodily warmth, that is similar to anger. Consequently, there seem to be cases of basic hatred, or derived hatred, that are not “cold calculations,” that do not reveal themselves as such. Let us think of the “cacerolazos” staged by the people in Argentina who oppose the notion of poor people receiving social benefits or State assistance. Here there is hatred, not just anger. And the banging of pots and pans, the furious shouts, and the distorted faces have little to say about the time that sculpts a cold mask. Hatred cannot always be hidden.

Perhaps, in the light of my remarks, we should reserve a conception of the concepts of anger and emotion that is sensitive, at times, to the mix, to the existence of non-basic cases. In basic cases, the classical conception of concepts would work according to which a concept applies every time its necessary and sufficient conditions of application are met. At any rate, for a conception such as the one embodied by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*, concepts are not applied like that, all or nothing. But rather in terms of family likenesses (Margolis & Laurence 1999). Before less pure cases it may be that, from the point of view of conceptual analysis, we are not able to draw ‘dichotomies’ between anger and hatred: I understand the concepts in mutually exhaustive and exclusive terms. If from my empirical hypothesis we accept that there are mixed cases, we may at least say that a particular case looks more like a case of basic anger or hatred, but nothing more.

I want to be clearer when speaking of a mix. The particular cases of anger and hatred may be alchemized with other different emotions, such as I have exemplified with projective fear and disgust. Describing cases as anger or hatred, or just as projective phobias or disgusts, partly depends on freely employing the expression used by my colleague Sol Yuan (2021; 2022), of the “glow” radiated by the case for a well-intentioned observer or interpreter. ‘Well-intentioned’ means that the interpreter does not propose to adulterate the status of the case; rather, she seeks a complex balance between the brilliant aspects of the case and her own hermeneutist purposes (Yuan 2021; 2022). Secondly, a case may be mixed because, for the case of hatred, it may derive from status anger or from just anger. In both situations, the mutation of anger into hatred may be illustrated as a set of points on a line. Depending on what point in the line the observer, or the philosopher, places herself to characterize the case: whether it can be catalogued as dichotomous in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Or whether, at best, we are able to establish family likenesses.
4. A philosophical consideration on some practical effects of the distinction between anger and hatred

All of the preceding analytical digression is not for purely theoretical reasons. I intend to point out that there is a practical impact according to whether or not we distinguish anger from hatred clearly. Either whether 'clear' is a type of predicate that alludes to the fact that a case C is one of anger or hatred, reckoned in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, or whether it is in the key of family likenesses.

My hypothesis is that democracies, generally speaking, tend to deal differently with anger and with hatred. Such a hypothesis is to be taken laxly. It arises from a personal set of philosophical observations and considerations. I call this different treatment 'practical effects' or practical consequences of the distinctions that I have been discussing thus far. It therefore seems that, for politicians, judges and other players in democracies, the conceptual aspects are relevant after all. Except that such relevance may overlap relatively with the discussion of a substantive normative topic: what is to be done with manifestations of anger, what is to be done with manifestations of hatred. For the players in any democracy, it may not be enough to be minimally clear about the conceptual complexity of the issue, but at least it does appear to be a necessary topic.

In the wake of the distinctions made in the previous section, I will attempt in the following one to distinguish between cases of basic anger and hatred with respect to mixed cases. I will defend the following ideas: that democracies tend to “regulate” expressions of anger, that is to say, to limit them or potentially redirect them towards more polite means. I will also argue that democracies tend to “forbid” or reduce manifestations of hatred to a minimum. When I say that democracies “tend,” I am using a dispositional verb because it is impossible to establish an analytical link between anger, hatred and normative forms in democracies. There are certain contingent elements in this link. As I am talking about trends, I will propose my thesis in the style of a heterodox quantifier “for the majority of C cases” there is usually a regulation, or a prohibition is often verifiable.

Let us begin with the most basic cases with certain analytical caution. One basic case of anger is that of social protest (Benente 2015, 19-44). Although there are silent, serene protest rallies, the protest rallies I have in mind now are those that express a lot of anger by burning tires, hurling insults, using fireworks, etc. These kinds of protests seek to exert pressure or give strength to claims that have long gone unanswered by a democratic system. In other words, the kind of social protest that I am interested in is that which expresses a social injustice or the intersection of several injustices (Butler, 2017, 34). Substantive discussions around a protest are often diverse in nature. For example, whether they should be “regulated” (Benente, 2015). Some jurists, however, expect to “forbid” them as they consider very restrictively that representative democracies inhibit the people from debating of their own accord in the streets. That is why some tend to see them as crimes of sedition. For all that, the most liberal arc of jurists in Argentina, as is the case of Gargarella (2008, 27), tend to dissuade regulation
a far as possible as protest has a democratic value that consists in broadening liberties to give a voice to those who do not usually have a voice in Parliament. That is, to broaden and improve representation to enrich public debate and to give expression greater density and freedom. For all that, in a broad spectrum of political options, protest rallies are often criminalized de facto, rather than de jure, when they are dubbed “riots” or some such things. Such names fulfill the performative role of considering them “forces of nature” that threaten the hypothetical “civil pact” and must therefore be stopped, penalized by the criminal code. In short, I would say that democracies, in terms of what I maintained in quoting Gargarella, generally tend to regulate social protests, attempting to respect the normative nuclei or values they serve, while a more conservative sector seeks to penalize them criminally.

A case of basic hatred would be that of Argentine journalist Baby Etchecopar. In his news program he claimed that a group of women who had attended an “escrache” protest against him were “dykes,” “pot smokers,” “scummy,” “bastards,” “louts,” “filthy shameless people,” “morons,” “smelling of menstruation.”

By using derisive adjectives like the ones I have quoted literally, a passion can be identified which is not that of anger, whose reference to the world (in just anger) is given by the existence of injustice. To a considerable extent the case is basic because he “fabricates” or “projects” a series of negative epithets on the women. The purpose of these is to diminish, shame, humiliate the victim. They are more elliptical ways of not recognizing any moral value whatsoever in them. They may even generate anguish in the victims. It is not necessary for every case of basic hatred to entail the destruction of the other in the literal sense as occurred, for example, with the Nazi gas chambers.

Martha Nussbaum (2019, 196-197) reconstructed Etchecopar’s case as one of hatred, but from the alchemy (she calls it “explosive cocktail”) of misogyny and sexism. The references to menstruation, to filth, are, on the part of the journalist, examples of projective disgust, mutated into aversion and hatred towards women. In the light of this quotation, I could be rebutted by saying that this is a case mixed by the alchemy of the present. However, as I have admitted earlier, a variety of alchemies or connections may exist in virtually all emotions. Following Sol Yuan I spoke of the “glow” in our perception. In using this expression, I accounted for the fact according to which perception could capture hatred as the most salient element of a case made up of the alchemy between a variety of emotions; and this salient element somehow guides the case’s description as basic. For the purposes I wish to distinguish, the case illustrated by the journalist was criminally penalized and by means of what is called “probation” or a conditional sentence, Etchecopar was obliged to present a “micro feminist section” on his news program. In other words, he received a criminal penalty. This is based on the fact that, in democratic societies, beyond the differences in their legal designs, certain classes of hatred are forbidden. Either under the form of “hate speeches,” or under the form of what are called “hate crimes.” Nevertheless, it is an empirical truth that there are many situations of hatred that do not reach the criminal system. Which is why Adela Cortina (2017, 40) adopted the idea according to which there are so-called “hate incidents,” those...
towards which a democratic system “turns a blind eye,” failing to address them from the point of view of forbidding hate speeches or crimes. Quite possibly, this “ignoring” hate incidents is part of a way of reconciling freedom of expression with other norms. However, there is a kind of variable threshold in every democracy beyond which what I call an ‘incident’ mutates into a ‘speech crime’ (Cueva Fernández 2012, 437-455) and into a hate crime (Peralta 2013).

Nonetheless, we philosophers should admit that the clarity that allows us to identify basic cases is not always available. The world is a mix and our concepts are not always able to operate in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Below I present two types of mixed or “ambiguous” cases. The cases of radical vegans and radical feminists, respectively. Let us begin with hard vegans.

A group of radicalized vegans go to some butchers and fishmongers, or restaurants that have some dishes with meat on their menus, and destroy them with sticks and stones, expelling their terrified owners. In the Spanish daily El País, on June 29, 2018⁹, the journalist signing the article, Silvia Ayuso, remarked, among other things, the following:

French butchers are fed up. So are some fishmongers. And many restaurant owners. The acts of vandalism against their stores perpetrated by tiny minority groups of radical vegans has multiplied over recent months. Suppliers of products that are indispensable for the dishes that have exalted French cuisine feel harassed. The butchers’ lobby is now on a war footing, claiming assistance from the government to be able to continue their work in peace. They say that what they are suffering is no less than “terrorism.” And they consider their battle to be one against the “dictates of a few fanatics” in order to defend something basic in the country, the French people’s right to eat whatever they like, they claim.

The other case I wanted to examine is that of so-called “radical feminists” (RADFEM is the acronym). In some of their habitual discussions about who can attend the rallies it is often claimed that it is a rally of “women” and not transsexuals.¹⁰ I would like to assume my sympathy for feminism in general at the outset on account of its just claims. In some of their rallies it is possible to witness the type of force in the claim that I have already pointed out in relation to social protests against injustice. That is, the claims of the radical feminists I have in mind are compatible with just anger. However, if in some sectors the presence of transsexuals is inhibited, some might think that the just anger is degenerating into some kind of “trans-hatred” or “trans-phobia.” It must be admitted that this is another possible example of a mixed case. That anger can become hatred is one of the fears that concerns Martha Nussbaum (2018, 68) in Anger and forgiveness. It is why she initially discards status anger. Secondly, she

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¹⁰ This is so because, as one of this paper’s anonymous reviewers correctly points out, this class of feminism is of the “biologist” type and believes that certain transgender persons, having been born men, start out with the advantages of the so-called “patriarchy.”
only preserves just anger insofar as it is an anger she calls of the “transitional” type. Transitional anger is precisely that which mutates gradually, though not towards hatred; quite the contrary: towards a greater cooperation between the conflicting parties, with the strengthening of eyes set on a better future, attempting to bridge differences among conflicting groups, etc. The models Nussbaum has in mind when she talks about this political anger are Martin Luther King, Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela. These models are for her examples to follow because they start out with anger, but move towards a search for cooperation for the sake of a better future, leaving violence aside. Transition anger is compatible with Aristotle’s intuitions in the sense that, once the motivation of the anger has been satisfied, it tends to relent. On the other hand, in Nussbaum’s thought, the notion of transitional anger fits partially into the Stoic doctrine of authors like Seneca, who want “gentle” or “serene” sentiments to dominate moral reasoning.

5. Final Considerations

In this tribute to Jonathan Haidt I have dealt with a topic that concerned him considerably: the status of emotions according to the terms of moral psychology. To this end I proposed to examine, more philosophically than psychologically, two emotions: anger and hatred. My objectives were, first, to show the analytical difficulties involved in the conceptual distinction between anger and hatred. I claimed as an analytical remedy that the concepts are sometimes basic, and sometimes mixed, that we can occasionally use concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions and sometimes not, we simply have to do so in the manner of family likenesses.

I subsequently tried to show that the conceptual distinction can have practical effects, especially in the political environment of democracies. I sustained the dispositional-type thesis according to which democracies tend to regulate anger and forbid hatred. As it is a largely contingent thesis, I used the verb “tend” and maintained that a heterodox quantifier “for most of the C cases” makes it possible to formally reflect the two trends I have remarked upon: towards regulation, or towards prohibition. To sustain these disquisitions, I gave examples of certain kinds of social protest and of the hate speech of an Argentine journalist, respectively.

Possibly, though perhaps not only because of it, we might find in the background of the abovementioned trend of democracies to regulate anger and forbid hatred Aristotle’s old intuition, namely: that once anger “has satisfied its object”, it tends to relent, whereas hatred cannot be cured. I consider Aristotle’s intuition may hold a grain of truth as regards anger. And though I am inclined to endorse his pessimism – of a psychological kind – with hatred (that it has no cure), I am convinced that such a statement is highly problematic from the normative point of view. First because if it has no cure, the punitive norms I mentioned in my examples become ineffective. The hater will not change an inch in his set of beliefs or desires after being penalized. Such that in the example I gave of the journalist, obliging him
to add a feminist section to his program would sound like naiveté to Aristotle. Nevertheless, he would agree on the fact that the journalist would have to be penalized all the same because vice is punished and virtue rewarded. This places us in the serious predicament of thinking about how we ought to think about current criminal rights which, in the West, tend to be liberal and focus on action and not on character like the philosopher from Stagira. I cannot, however, discuss this point now.

I think a great moral, political and even psychological question would consist in enquiring in depth to what extent it is true or false to state that “hatred has no cure.” And if it were true – for empirical reasons, for example – what is there to be done, what should be done or, rather, what can be done, is an essential normative theme. A theme that leads us to the problem of assessing the effectiveness and justice of certain criminal penalties.

Be that as it may, let us remember that in this paper I have claimed that cases of anger or hatred are basic insofar as the interpreter convincingly defends the existence of a notable glow, be it of the emotion of anger or of the emotion of hatred. And this glow must weigh more than the considerations that may arise from identifying the alchemies that appear in connection with such emotions.

Likewise, and parallel to the basic cases, I have posed in this paper a couple of mixed cases as examples. These begin with anger and derive into hatred. These are the kinds of cases that particularly concern Nussbaum. Generally speaking, Nussbaum usually thinks that anger is a very unstable element for moral or political reasoning as, after starting out well, it can end badly. Let us think just by way of an example about (some) social “escrache” protests, about the famous “lynching” of thieves, about the “popular trials” of journalists, etc. It is because of these that Nussbaum proposes a normatively defensible notion of anger of the “transitional” type, which I have already defined above.

What might Haidt think of all these considerations at the end of the day? I am in no position to read his mind, but perhaps, to say the least, I dare say he might reach a provisional conclusion akin to the following: Just anger might be viewed, prima facie, as irrational in the sense that reason slowly and argumentatively offsets the relevant elements. Instead, I think Haidt would say that hatred appears to remain trapped in the purely emotional response, not mediated or concluded by slow, serene reasoning. It seems to me that the just irascible person (Haidt 2019) would correctly perceive injustice and oppression and would realize that the most effective way to be heard is by manifesting opinions with genuine rage. On the other hand, the “rationality” in the basic sense of hatred would appear, in Haidt’s terms, to be “rationalization” rather than rationality. This by definition: in just anger the object “irradiates signals for the angry person.” Whereas hatred in its basic sense fabricates its object in a certain sense, it goes from the hating subject towards the hated object. Although there are some elements to “hold onto,” the hater justifies himself, he “rationalizes” his behavior. This
rationalization lies behind his idea that the hated object does not deserve, in the multiple meanings of deserve, to exist. And this cannot count as authentic argumentative rationality such as Haidt has in mind, but rather as the cannibal tribe mentality some people possess.

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