

LEGISLATIVE CANDIDATE SELECTION AND INCUMBENT RENOMINATION IN MEXICO

Selección de candidatos legislativos y renominación de incumbentes en México

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ABSTRACT

Despite the abundant literature on consecutive reelection, few works examine how party leaders' preferences over incumbent traits can affect the future positions of sitting legislators. This paper examines how consecutive reelection and strong party leader control over candidate selection combine to promote certain types of politicians for renominations for reelection, while others are consigned to candidacies for lower posts or left out of the selection process. We use Mexico's first experience with consecutive reelection since 1932 to better understand how incumbents' interests and the demands of party leaders shape candidacy outcomes by examining whether the incumbents from the 2018-2021 term were able to win a renomination bid or were sent to a higher or lower post.

Keywords: Mexico, reelection, legislators, preferences, party leaders

RESUMEN

A pesar de la gran cantidad de trabajo que existe sobre la reelección consecutiva, pocos han estudiado cómo las preferencias de los dirigentes partidistas por ciertas características de sus legisladores pueden afectar la probabilidad de ganar o no la nominación a la reelección o un puesto más alto. La mayoría de los diputados federales quieren mantener sus puestos en la Cámara Baja; sin embargo, este resultado depende de las preferencias de los líderes de los partidos, porque ellos deciden si los diputados de su bancada merecen la oportunidad de competir para ganar otra vez un curul (la re-nominación para competir). Usamos los 500 diputados federales en México que entraron en 2018 y salieron en 2021 y estuvieron posibilitados para competir para el puesto otra vez para entender interacción entre las preferencias de los líderes partidistas y los políticos ambiciosos.

Palabras clave: México, reelección, legisladores, preferencias, líderes partidistas



I. INTRODUCTION

This paper examines which congressional incumbents win a nomination for consecutive reelection in a consolidating democracy – Mexico’s – in the federal legislature’s first opportunity to reelect sitting deputies in 90 years (2021). Reselection, and legislative turnover more generally, are important questions, because, as Krupnikov and Shipan (2018) argue, too many new members of congress limit the body’s policy expertise, and too few new legislators suggest voters cannot easily punish unresponsive legislators. Because Mexico’s constitutional prohibition of consecutive reelection at the federal level lasted through 2018, this is a first examination of how sitting deputies and party leaders will behave now that reelection has been reinstated.

One of the central tenants in the United States literature on legislative politics is that most representatives wish to run for reelection, because it is unlikely that they would risk their posts to compete for another, especially due to incumbency advantage and the risks of running for higher posts (Eckles, Kam, Maestas, and Schaffner 2014; Jacobson 2015). Because candidates are chosen in primaries in the US, candidate selection controlled by party leadership is not an important factor in reselection. In many Western European democracies, on the other hand, closed (or partially closed) list electoral systems and electoral volatility are believed to be the main drivers behind legislative turnover (which is normally not measured at the level of individual choice, but at the legislative aggregate). Ballot structure makes an important difference in rates of reselection (and reelection): plurality or single-member-district (SMD) deputies enjoy an advantage because they are better known to voters than their colleagues who run on the closed proportional representation (PR) lists, and thus, they are more valuable to party leaders who wish to retain or improve their seat counts. In many of these cross-national works, however, the individual legislator’s decision to stay or go is of little interest, although later articles recognize that party selection is an important matter to consider (Gouglas and Maddens 2019).

What is less studied are the traits of individual incumbents that make them more (or less) attractive to party leaders after having served a term in the national congress. Instead of examining aggregate legislative periods, or assuming decentralized candidate selection, this work studies how party selectors use the individual traits of sitting deputies to determine whether to nominate them for another congressional run. Furthermore, instead of simply defining the choice as renomination or not, we disaggregate future posts into five different outcomes: retirement or death, not winning a future post, a nomination to a lower post, reselection, or a higher position. This separation is much closer to reality, and it allows us to better measure what incumbent traits matter most for reselection, while distinguishing between more desirable political positions from less important posts.

By delving into the interaction between the interests of party selectors (in this case, party leaders) and the individual characteristics of incumbents, such as

background experience and leadership posts, we help explain why, even in single-member-districts (SMDs), where we should see the highest rates of consecutive reelection because of the importance of the personal image in voters' choices at the ballot box, many Mexican incumbents are sent by their party leaders to compete for other political positions instead of being allowed to run again for their congressional seat (Preece 2014; Marino and Martocchia Di-dati 2017; Gouglas and Maddens 2019). Because we control for potential confounders, such as candidate selection methods and ballot structure in Mexico's two-tier electoral system, we are better able to pinpoint the individual characteristics of incumbents and how they interact with the interests of party leaders' who control their future career paths.

We posit that most federal deputies want to remain in office, as it is a good political post (with excellent salaries and possibilities for networking and national media exposure) and for most incumbents, staying put is less risky than running for a higher post (Black 1972) and is a better career decision than moving to a lower post.¹ However, as has been shown for other federal democracies in Latin America, such as Brazil and Argentina (Samuels 2000; Jones 2002; Micozzi and Lucardi 2021), reelection is not always the only goal sought by professional politicians. We know from prior work on Latin America's three federalist regimes that the state and municipal levels of government offer resources for a lengthy political career (Kerevel 2014). While governors in Mexico can serve a single six-year term, mayors can serve up to 12 years in power, and these political positions offer resources and connections to state government, and therefore, a path to the governor's mansion. We will demonstrate that Mexico low reselection rates are partially driven by some incumbents who prefer to compete for a nomination for mayoral office or a position in their state cabinet, which in Mexico, as in Argentina and Brazil, is often considered a better post than the federal congress (Samuels 2000; Leoni, Pereira and Renno 2004; Micozzi and Lucardi 2021).

The personal ambitions of incumbents confront the preferences of party leaders in situations where leaders control candidate selection for almost all elected positions, as in Mexico. Leaders have a complicated set of interests, which include protecting seat counts and promoting their personal careers. These interests can be furthered by the careful selection of factional allies to run for important elected posts, as well as retaining or raising the number of elected posts won by their party. Therefore, one expects that sitting deputies with ties to party leaders and prior elected experience will be those most likely to win reselection. Those incumbents with less experience leading up to their term in

¹ Black (1972) assumed that many politicians would want to compete for higher office, if and only if the costs and risks of competing for the nomination and in the general election were not greater than the value of incumbency. But, considering the costs mentioned by Black, it seems that most incumbents would *not* prefer to run for a different elected position. We are agnostic in the debate of static versus progressive ambition as the costs associated for running for another office tend to be so high that only the most qualified politician would consider this option.

Congress can be ignored by party leaders as they tend to be less well known to voters, less experienced, and less important members of a party leader's internal faction. Party leaders will take advantage of their control over candidacies for other elected positions and place them in lower posts or put them aside (for at least a term).

To capture the importance of personal incumbents' characteristics in the face of centralized candidate selection, this paper examines Mexico, a mixed member majoritarian (MMM) system which elects 300 deputies in single member districts (SMDs) to the federal Chamber of Deputies and another 200 via the closed list proportional representation (PR) tier every three years, to determine how incumbents' backgrounds and legislative performance help determine whether they win reselection, a nomination to a higher post, a lower post, or are left out of politics completely. Our focus here is on whether the incumbent deputy wins the right to represent the party on the ballot in the next election - a process known as reselection or renomination - *not* on whether she is victorious in the general election, because this allows us to identify the nexus of incumbents' interests regarding their next post and the interests of party leaders to control their political elite via centralized candidate selection.² Democratic Mexico is an excellent case to study the relative weight of candidate selection and party interests: first, one can compare the SMD and PR tiers for differences in future opportunities based on paths to entry; second, 2021 is first time in 90 years that sitting federal deputies could run for the same office in the next legislative period; and third, Mexico's party leaders by and large control candidate selection for almost all posts.³

We find that certain incumbent traits, most importantly, prior elected experience, have a strong influence on the ability of some incumbents to win reselection. As expected, having won a plurality district is a much stronger base for reselection than having entered congress via the closed proportional representation (PR) lists. Another important finding is that having been a congressional leader during the 2018-2021 is a powerful boost toward a reselection - and that incumbents who had prior elected experience together with a congressional leadership position were more likely to win re-nomination or a candidacy to a higher post, such as mayor.

We will first examine the literature on the incumbency advantage and legislative turnover, then explain our argument and develop testable hypotheses. We then present a short section on the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. Finally, we will employ regression models using the four different possible outcomes: win-

² In a future paper, we will consider the ability of the incumbents to win reelection after gaining the party's renomination.

³ Following Jones (2002), because of the constitutional prohibition against consecutive reelection, the predecessors of today's Mexican politicians were professionals, yet they constantly revolved in and out of different offices, making all but a few of them amateur legislators.

ning a nomination to a better post; renomination for reelection, a nomination to a lower post; and finally, being excluded from all posts.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Altman and Chasquetti (2005) offered an important contribution to the study of legislative reselection and reelection in the Americas: they found that in the US Congress, 88% of incumbents ran for reelection, with Panama holding almost the same percentage at 87.5%. Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil constitute the second tier with 76%, 72% and 70% seeking reelection, respectively. Argentina - with its closed list PR system - brought up the rear with only 26% of incumbents nominated to run again for their seats. In Mexico's first congressional elections with the possibility of consecutive reelection 2021, renominations to the PR tier are closer to those of Argentina than Brazil's, with only 24% of incumbents who had arrived via the proportional representation lists (48 of 200) winning the candidacy for renomination, while in the 300 plurality districts, 53.6% (161) won renomination, which places Mexico well below Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. Overall, just under 42% of the nation's 500 incumbents were reselected.

When party leaders wield great control over candidate selection, it is difficult to identify incumbents' true preferences over future positions, so we employ two important assumptions: first, politics is a viable career option, and politicians would wish to continue in it. One aspect of political survival (Ames 1990) are the costs and risks associated with running for a higher post; thus, incumbents would prefer to stay in congress *unless* the electoral calendar and their personal attributes allow them the opportunity to run for a better post with some hope of winning (Fiorina 1977). Second, all incumbents would prefer to stand for reelection rather than be nominated for a lower elected or appointed position or be ousted from political posts completely. However, if a wide gamut of posts is available, for example, because of three levels of government and concurrent electoral cycles, then politicians enjoy more opportunities to run for higher elected posts, which could lower reselection rates.

The Americanist literature on reselection and reelection tends to focus on the personal preferences of legislators and their decision calculus, in large part because of the nation's SMD balloting and primary nominations (Black 1972; Hall and Houweling 1995). Many US representatives run again because first, the US Congress offers a seniority system in which they can advance over time; second, candidate selection is extremely decentralized due to the primary system, so party leader preferences play little role at this stage; and finally, the personal vote is central because of first-past-the-post elections. The incumbency advantage is the positive gain that sitting deputies accrue with voters because they have served in congress, have already run a successful campaign, and have brought public resources back to the district, which creates incentives for representatives to search for opportunities to make themselves known to vot-

ers in single member districts (SMDs) or open-list proportional representation systems (OLPR). As a result, in systems in which one finds the personal vote and therefore, the incumbency advantage, one should also expect higher rates of incumbent reselection (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Hoyland, Hobolt, and Hix 2019).

Where voters cannot select a specific candidate, as in closed-list PR systems, they must rely on party label cues, and as a result, individual legislators have little reason to distinguish themselves from others based on their personal abilities. In studies based on cross-national cases (mostly European), the unit of analysis is not the individual member of parliament's (MP) decision to stay, retire, or compete for a higher post, but rather the turnover rates of parties across parliamentary terms – which implies that individuals' preferences are not the primary cause of reselection and reelection. Matland and Studlar (2004) found in a study of 25 industrialized nations that, as expected, PR systems had an important effect on reducing the rates of reselection and incumbency reelection. A second causal factor explaining legislative turnover in the cross-national literature is electoral volatility, which is strongly related to ballot structure as less known MPs voted in on closed PR lists are more easily defeated when electoral tides turn against their parties (Golosov 2017). As a result, party leaders should be more willing to deselect PR incumbents as their personal images matter less to voters' decisions, which allows them to place others on the closed lists to promote factional strength and elite mobility.

This discussion leads us to the first hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1. Those elected from single-member-districts will have a higher reselection rate than those who won via the PR lists.

Next, we turn to the nexus between incumbent traits and party leaders' preferences over which incumbent win which candidacy. In more recent works (Preece 2014; Marino and Martocchia Diodati 2017; Gouglass and Maddens 2019) scholars have asked how the interests of the 'selectorate' (those who choose candidates) affect legislative renomination and reelection, above and beyond the incentives of electoral rules. Preece (2014: 147) writes of the Lithuanian case, "Regardless of electoral rules, MPs whose future careers depend on getting renominated by central party leaders vote against the party less than those whose careers do not." Thus, candidate selection procedures become an external component to the individual decision calculus constructed by Black (1972) – one that does not depend on the preferences or risk analysis of the incumbents, but on their relationship with those who control nominations.

Mexico has moved in the direction of top-down candidate selection in the past 10 years (as will be discussed below). Because most candidacy decisions are made by party leaders, it is important to capture what they look for in the federal legislators, in addition to the preferences of incumbents. Leaders gener-

ally attempt to maintain unity, win elections, and pursue policy goals (Sjoblom 1968; Rahat and Hazan 2001; Vandeleene 2021), although these goals may conflict with each other.

Different politicians can fill these goals; so, what factors influence the type of candidates that party leaders seek? First, if party leaders are interested in their personal careers, they can build up their faction's strength by choosing allies for important posts, such as federal deputies, and then reselecting them at the end of the term. Factional membership is, however, extremely difficult to measure across 500 members of congress, so we use proxy measures to capture how close a deputy is to party leaders, as will be discussed in the empirical section.

Hypothesis 2. If party leaders care about strengthening their faction, they will reselect incumbents who are close to their intra-party group.

Next, a good deal has been written about the career mobility of Mexican legislators before the modern advent of consecutive reelection, which sets a baseline for understanding what has happened now that reelection is possible. Federalism, for example, has important effects on career paths (Langston 2010; Kerevel 2015), especially where the Mexican congress is not such a strong policy making institution as it is in the United States. Before the reinstatement of consecutive reelection, Kerevel found (2015: 151) found that many Mexican deputies returned to their home states to continue their political careers after serving one term as federal deputy, many competing to be mayor. Rosas and Langston (2011) noted the same, in large part because governors often supported their co-partisan legislators return to a state post after a stint in Congress.

Before the return of consecutive reelection in 2021, nearly all Mexican politicians sought to pursue long careers (Kerevel 2014). Many of the federal deputies began their careers in the local or state levels before winning a seat, and they resumed their search for posts in elected, administrative, or party positions after leaving the Congress. If their party held the federal government, many would find posts in a federal secretariate, and if the governor of their state were a co-partisan, they had a reasonable expectation of finding work in the sub-national realm (Langston 2010; Kerevel 2014). As a result, without consecutive reelection, the federal Congress was an excellent position from which one gained experience to run for mayor of a major city, win a high post in the state cabinet, or run for the Senate.

Literature on Argentine and Brazilian federalist regimes discovered something similar, even with consecutive reelection, running for mayor can be a better career move than remaining in the federal congress (Samuels 2000; Leoni, Pereira, and Renno 2004; Micozzi and Lucardi 2021). This progressive ambition to return to one's home state and run for mayor is often combined with strong local ties (as demonstrated by winning a plurality district) and richer political trajectories (prior elected experience) because party leaders would not deliver

a viable and valuable candidacy to politicians without a solid background and local contacts.

Hypothesis 3. Those deputies with higher quality backgrounds who entered congress by winning a plurality district have a higher probability of winning a renomination or the candidacy for a higher post at the sub-national level.

Finally, the legislative behavior of the incumbents during their term in office should be a signal for party leaders as to the quality of the politician in question, and whether he or she merits another term in congress (Preece 2014). “Performance” can be divided into roughly three components; first, discipline or whether the deputy voted with her party leader; second, hard work or whether the legislator personally sponsors bills; and finally, disruption of different sorts which measures whether the representative suffered public scandals, switched parties, left the congress, and came back, or replaced an elected deputy as her substitute.

Hypothesis 4: If legislative performance is important in party leaders’ renomination calculus, then incumbents who are more productive and more loyal to their caucus leader, should win have a higher probability of reselection to congress or a candidacy to a higher post than those who were disloyal or unproductive.

III. THE ROAD TO THE MEXICAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES (AND AWAY FROM IT)

Mexico has a mixed-member majoritarian system with 300 deputies chosen from plurality districts and 200 from five closed-list districts with a magnitude of 40. Only one ballot is offered to voters, such that their vote choice in their SMD district is then aggregated to one of the five multimember PR districts. For example, if a party wins 30 percent of the ballots in its multistate, regional district, then it will send the first 12 names of its closed 40-person PR list to the chamber of deputies. This makes the candidates of each of the nation’s 300 plurality districts important vote getters regardless of whether they can win the district - because their party’s ballots are aggregated at the regional level to win PR seats.

Over the past 10 to 15 years, candidate selection in all of Mexico’s major parties has transitioned from somewhat open and decentralized to almost completely closed and centralized to the national or state levels. As was the case globally, in the late 1990s and into the 2000s, parties in Mexico tended to use decentralized candidate selection methods (Bruhn 2013; Bruhn and Wuhs 2016). After 2010, however, this move toward internal democracy reversed, as shown in Table 1.1 and 1.2, below. To gather these data, the author searched newspaper during the specific selection time frame for a random sample of 200 of the 300 SMDs for each of the main parties over the course of three congressional cycles.

The sample of 200 of each party's 300 SMDs were drawn separately, and these same districts for each party were used for each electoral cycle.⁴ We define open nominations as those with more than one candidate on the ballot, chosen by party delegates or in a primary.

TABLE 1.1. Percentage of Open Nominations for SMD Federal Deputies, Three Main Parties, 2009-2015*

	%2009	%2012	%2015
PAN	31.2	56	37.5
PRD	18	54	0
PRI	20	3	0
Total	300	300	300

Source: Langston (2018).

Table 1.2. Percentage of Open Nominations, Main Parties and Coalitions SMD and PR, 2021

	%PR	%SMD
MORENA	30	0
PAN ⁵	0	0
PAN-PRI-PRD ⁶	0	0
PRI ⁷	0	0

Source: Langston, Joy

⁴ *200 districts randomly selected for each of the three main parties: PRI, PAN, PRD.

⁵ See the PAN's information about their candidate selection procedure (Ciudad de México, a 3 de febrero de 2021), <https://www.pan.org.mx/prensa/aprueba-accion-nacional-candidatas-y-candidatos-a-diputados-federales-por-mayoria-y-de-representacion-proporcional>, "La elección de estas candidaturas (candidatos a diputados federales por mayoría y de representación proporcional) corresponde a la Comisión Permanente del Consejo Nacional, integrada por 62 miembros." Also, the Agreement with the three parties making up the Coalition PAN-PRI-PRD. <https://votoinformado.unam.mx/archivos/uploads/2021/04/Convenio-Integrado-Va-por-Mexico.pdf>. The formal rules of PR selection in the PAN can be found in https://www.ieepco.org.mx/archivos/partidos-politicos/pan/PAN_Estatutos_abril16.pdf, pp. 54-58. The specific rules for 2021. <https://www.angulo7.com.mx/2021/01/04/pan-publica-convocatoria-para-elegir-candidatos-a-diputados-federales/>. De la designación de los candidatos se indicó que será la Comisión Permanente del Consejo Nacional del Partido Acción Nacional, **will designate the candidates for federal deputies for plurality districts.** (Designará las candidaturas a Diputaciones Federales por el principio de mayoría relativa del Partido Acción Nacional por el Estado de Puebla). The coalition held in 219 of the 300 SMDs in 2021. <https://www.jornada.com.mx/notas/2021/01/18/estados/pan-del-edomex-elegira-a-sus-candidatos-con-metodo-de-designacion/>

⁶ In 2021, the PRI chose its candidates via the **Comisión Nacional de Procesos Internos (CNPI)**. It seemed that the PRI wanted to find as many unity candidates as possible; and it that were not possible, then the CNPI would apply an exam in which they would evaluate their level of knowledge, abilities that are needed to be a legislator. In other words, the PRI did not use primaries or constituency level party assemblies to choose its candidates, either those in the Coalition or those it ran on its own. Violeta Huerta, "Convoca PRI a aspirantes a diputados federales- EDOMEX." *El Sol de Toluca*, 2 de enero de 2021."

⁷ We do not use the INE's official information on candidate selection because parties have strong incentives to not be fully clear or honest about their selection methods because of INE regulations. Instead, we searched newspapers because before 2018 and 2021 (when most parties simply started designating candidates), they gave specific information about which method was used in each district in each state.

The numbers for 2021 in Table 1.2 show that the openness of candidate selection has fallen yet more since the watershed election of 2018, as even the once-decentralized PAN has now resorted almost completely to top-down designations for its plurality nominations (PR selection in the PAN had always been decided by a complicated measure involving both the national party and state delegates).

The factional nature of Mexico's PRI, PAN, and PRD has been well studied (Bruhn 1997; Mizrahi 2001; Wuhs 2008 Langston 2017), so here, we will only look at Morena's internal configuration. The leaders of Morena (including the current president Andrés Manuel López Obrador), a party born from the internal battles of the leftist PRD, learned little from the selection conflicts of its foundational party, and its factions continued clashing over candidacies (Bolívar Meza 2017). What is more, when the party's formal leader, Mario Delgado, went from state to state in early 2021 to gain information to make candidate choices, he was often booed and harassed by those who were in danger of being left out.⁸ In both the 2018 and 2021 elections, Morena's leaders only allowed a small number of PR candidacies to be chosen through democratic means, in this case, using the 'tombola' or by lot.⁹ The SMD candidates were designated almost entirely through top-down methods. Thus, we have no doubts that factions play a major role in MORENA as they do in the nation's three largest traditional parties.

These factions help their members reach higher posts in return for loyalty to their leader; and many times, members stay for years as 'Politician's X's person, following the group's leaders and depending on them for their political positions, so we believe that this type of relationship is relevant for politicians to better construct long-term career paths, and therefore, party leaders choose a high percentage of candidates for elected offices who belong to their intra-party group because then these elected figures will owe their loyalty to that leader.

Now, we consider the place of a federal deputy seat among the wider set of political posts available to politicians, depending on their backgrounds and capabilities. Even though the sub-national arena is important politically, there is little doubt that a federal congressional seat is an excellent political position, and that many incumbents wish to remain in their seats. One of the reasons for this interest is that federal deputies have excellent jobs: they earn almost 20

⁸ For more on federal deputy candidate selection in 2021, see: <https://contrasena.com.mx/2021/02/16/a-prueba-democracia-interna-en-morena/>. <https://www.eloccidental.com.mx/local/mario-delgado-llama-a-la-unidad-morenista-en-jalisco-6470844.html>.

⁹ Ura Moreno, *Milenio*, March 30, 2021. According to another author, most of MORENA's candidates were chosen by designation and some by lot. "Eligen por sorteo a candidatos a diputados federales plurinominales de Morena." Jorge Torres, *Plano Informativo*, March 18, 2021. The party's Comisión Nacional de Elecciones made these decisions. Rafael Ramírez, "Morena retrasa selección de candidatos a diputados federales," writes that MORENA had to change the date of publishing its candidates several times and changed its selection method from polling to a grading system that was based on the political profile of the potential candidates. *El Sol de México*, March 9, 2021.

times the minimum wage in Mexico;¹⁰ and eight times more than the average wage in Mexico City.¹¹ Federal representatives can travel to exotic destinations paid for by public resources; and before 2018, they had secretaries and at least one advisor. If they are presidents of committees, they are paid more. When they speak on the floor, they can place these videos on their social media pages, and Chamber leaders are often interviewed on radio and television. Sitting in the Chamber allows them to make connections to co-partisan legislators from other states; to be in closer contact with national party leaders; and to build relationships that last into the future. Therefore, this work does not find that being a federal deputy is a 'consolation' prize as it might be in other federal, presidential regimes, such as Argentina (Micozzi and Lucian 2021) or Brazil (Samuels 2000; Leoni, Pereira, and Renno 2004).

IV. EMPIRICS

To properly capture the interaction between centralized party selection control and individual incumbent preferences, this paper uses a distinctive dependent variable. Instead of a simple binary measure (renominated or not renominated), the author divides the outcome into five different possibilities: first, the deputy was not nominated to any post in the next round; second, the incumbent retired or died; third, the party nominated or appointed the incumbent to a lower post; fourth, the deputy won a nomination for reelection; and finally, the deputy captured a nomination to a higher post. Why is this a better measure than a binary term? A higher post is not a negative outcome, which it would be if we used an indicator variable, and this measure allows us to catch differences among future candidacies that place renomination in proper perspective as compared to other possible candidacies. To find immediate future candidacies, the author searched newspapers, official documents, and social media outlets for the 500 sitting deputies from the 2018-2021 legislature (LXIV). Table 2 below displays the four outcomes in numbers and percentages.

¹⁰ The minimum wage of 2020 in Mexico was \$123.22 pesos a day, which is roughly \$4,000.00 pesos a month. Federal deputies, on the other hand, earn – after taxes – 1,264,536 pesos a year plus another \$264,000 pesos in extras. Deputies also benefit from major medical insurance, a special year-end payment, a matched savings plan, life insurance, and funeral expenses. 152,698 pesos mensuales que les da San Lázaro por dieta, alimentos y atención legislativa. <https://www.forbes.com.mx/politica-52-de-500-diputados-no-reeleccion/>. http://www.diputados.gob.mx/transparencia_archivo/prgnmts_frcts.html. State deputies earn roughly half of their federal counterparts, or \$56,160 pesos a month. <https://www.eluniversalpuebla.com.mx/politica/cuanto-gana-un-diputado-federal>.

¹¹ The average monthly wage in Mexico City as of 2020, was \$9,329 pesos.

Table 2. Five Future Candidacy Outcomes for Incumbent Federal Deputies, 2021

POSTS	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
No future post	125	25.2
Retired or died	24	4.8
Lower post	94	18.8
Reselection	211	42.2
Higher post	45	9
TOTAL	499 ¹²	100

Source: Author's data base.

This paper considers “higher posts” to be those that allow the politician more income, voters, recognition, and possibilities for budgetary largess. For federal deputies, then, we consider gubernatorial, senate, and mayoral posts as more desirable. As in Brazil and Argentina, mayoral posts are prime political prizes because mayors can spend more resources,¹³ they can make business deals, and if they are mayors of large cities, they can plot a path toward the governor’s mansion. Furthermore, many mayors earn more than federal deputies. We also consider cabinet positions in state or federal government as more attractive posts.

Lower positions for an incumbent federal deputy are those such as city councilperson or state deputy, a low-level position in the party or in state and municipal government. A glance at Mexico’s electoral calendar shows that Senate seats (with a term of six years, larger number of voters, and higher pay) are not elected during midterm elections; while in the 2021 midterms, consecutive elections were held for 15 governorships, along with seats in 30 state congresses.

One could argue that any political post is a good position in Mexico’s political system, such that the notion of higher or lower positions makes little sense (except for the senate, a gubernatorial post, or the presidency). It is true that some municipalities are larger and therefore, more important in a politician’s career path than others, or that certain state cabinet appointments are better than others. Nonetheless, Kerevel (2015: 151) notes that the first stop of leaving deputies before reelection was legalized was a post as a mayor and had grown from just over 10% in 2000 to 22.6% of all leavers as of 2009. Similarly, when checking the names of candidacies in the municipalities against the largest city in the district, one finds many municipalities are state capitals or the largest cities or towns in the incumbent’s home district. This tells us that being mayor of the largest town in the deputy’s home district is seen as a career plus, such that we can speak of returning to the municipal level of government as a higher post, much as other scholars have found in Argentina and Brazil.

¹² The author was unable to find the last deputy, which explains why the final count is 499 instead of 500 deputies.

¹³ Smith and Revell (2016).

Furthermore, if it were true that for incumbents, higher and lower are not relevant categories, then we would see that a similar number of deputies would voice interest in a nomination for city council person in the nomination period than they would for other posts. We measured the first reported statements or actions taken by seated deputies before and during the nomination period and found that only 12 sitting deputies desired a post as a local deputy or city councilperson, as opposed to 281 who wished to run for reelection and 114 who wished to run for a higher post, such as governor or mayor, supporting the argument that 'lower posts' do exist as a category.

It can be difficult to distinguish between the decision of a deputy to retire and the decision by party leaders not to nominate the incumbent for any post. Fortunately, in December of 2020 before the start of the nomination season (roughly January – April 2020), sitting deputies were obligated to write an official note to the head of the Chamber of Deputies, stating their interest in running for reelection in the next election. 445 deputies wrote this letter, such that 55 incumbents were either assured a nomination for a higher post or truly interested in retiring. Of the 55 incumbents who did not write an official note, 21 (or 47%) were not renominated to a future post; many of them are older, so we can assume that many of them, in effect, retired. In a similar fashion to Hall and van Houweling (1995), we have excluded retired (or deceased deputies) from the dataset, leaving 471 cases.¹⁴ The other 34 (or 53%) wanted to run for a different post or for reelection as demonstrated by their nominations.

V. MEASURES OF THE HYPOTHESES

This paper uses an indicator variable to distinguish between deputies who won a SMD or who entered via the closed PR lists to test the first hypothesis, with '1' as SMD. To determine whether deputies with higher quality backgrounds who entered congress by winning a plurality district have a higher probability of winning a nomination to run for a higher post at the sub-national level, such as mayor or even governor (hypothesis 3), we employ an indicator variable to distinguish between those with prior elected background at any level of government and those who do not.

We have hypothesized (hypothesis 2) that party leaders decide at least some of their candidacies based on factional membership. To test this, we employ two different measures of ties to important party leaders: the first is prior political experience as it stands to reason that that over time, those with prior political experience have formed part of a party faction, which is what allows them to win nominations. However, these factions may not continue to be important,

¹⁴ The authors (1995, 126) excluded from their dataset 13 US representatives who retired from the House to seek higher office because their interest was in retirement vs running for office once again. We do the opposite, as we are not interested in why some members retired, and so, we do not include them.

so we also use an indicator variable to measure whether the deputy served as a committee chair in the term that is ending. Committee chairs, as well as leaders of other intra-mural bodies are chosen by party leaders within the Chamber are party leaders themselves. A leadership position within the Chamber is not a ceremonial post as it requires both skills and relationships with other recognized leaders within and outside the congressional body. Intramural leadership positions include: a presidency of a committee; leader of a party's caucus; a position on the Mesa Directiva, or on the Joint Committee of Political Coordination, which oversees negotiations of the legislative initiatives between the Senate and the Chamber. The two variables held conjointly is a sign of both elected experience that required some positive relationship with a party chiefs and congressional leadership that depended on the same, so in a graph of the marginal probabilities below (Graph 3), we examine their interaction.

The next hypothesis (3) considers whether those incumbents with higher quality backgrounds who entered congress by winning a plurality district have a higher probability of winning a renomination or the candidacy for a higher post at the sub-national level, such as mayor. Our two variables of interest are prior elected posts and whether the incumbent entered via a SMD or the closed PR lists. First, due to the lack of Senate elections in 2021, we believe that running for mayor, governor, or hoping to be considered for a state cabinet post, are the most attractive positions in the subnational arena, while winning a plurality district is an indicator of local and state connections. To determine whether deputies have higher quality backgrounds, we employ an indicator variable to distinguish between those with prior elected background at any level of government and those without. Second, prior elected posts denote at least good relations with a party faction, as discussed above. In Graph 3, we consider the two variables together.

To measure hypothesis 4, (party leaders should care about deputies' legislative behavior when deciding to reselect an incumbent or nominate her to a higher post), we employ different measures: first, legislative activity – the number of bills personally initiated by the deputy. Second, we examine the individual's loyalty or obedience to her caucus leaders (measured as the percentage of times individual deputy voted with her caucus leader). And finally, we look at a negative dimension of legislative performance, which is defined as disruptions or scandals, which we measure with separate indicator variables for party switching during the congressional term, violence (or other scandalous behavior) that took place during the congressional term,¹⁵ leaving one's congressional seat to later return, or serving as a substitute deputy (*suplente*) for the original deputy, who has left her seat for whatever reason. Because all these separate measures are negative, we believe we can safely place them in a single dummy variable,

¹⁵ To determine whether a scandal had occurred, we made an exhaustive search for every legislator in the database to find their background posts, their future posts, and any relevant details about their behavior both before and after their three-year stint in Congress. Thus, it was relatively easy to find whether they had left their seat and returned, whether they had been involved in a scandal, or had switched parties.

which we do in the first model, while in the second, we separate them because they may not all denote negative behavior or do so in different ways.

Our control variables are gender (0=man and 1=woman), age, and education attainment, which is measured on a three-point scale: 1 for high school, 2 for college, and 3 for post-graduate studies. The excluded variable is high school. We also control for the party in which the deputy ended her term.

We run a multinomial logit of the 2021 incumbent deputies, with the dependent variable constructed in the following way: 0 = no post; 1= a nomination to a lower post (city councilperson, state deputy, a low-level post in the party), 2 = a renomination to run again for the congressional seat; and 3 = a nomination to a higher post, such as governor, mayor, or an appointment as a cabinet member in state or federal government. Retired and deceased deputies were excluded, leaving 473 of the 499 incumbents in our sample. The logits are multinomial because the structure of the data is not well suited for an ordered logit, as it is impossible to know whether not winning an immediate post is as different from winning a lower post as a lower post is from winning renomination. The base category of the multinomial logit is *no future post* (0 on the scale from 0 to 4) and we employ party fixed effects (not shown in the table) because we believe that omitted factors in the regression may correlate with our independent variables as a group.¹⁶

Table 3: Multinomial Regression Models


	MODEL 1			MODEL 2		
	LOWER POST	RESELECTION	HIGHER POST	LOWER POST	RESELECTION	HIGHER POST
Election Type 1=SMD	0.62* (0.33)	1.8*** (0.29)	1.98*** (0.47)	0.35 (0.35)	1.8*** (0.3)	2.02*** (0.48)
Prior Elected Experience	0.4 (0.34)	.83*** (0.3)	1.0** (0.43)	0.36 (0.36)	0.81*** (0.3)	0.97** (0.44)
Concurrent governor race	0.73** (0.33)	0.28 (0.30)	0.66 (0.42)	0.76** (0.33)	0.33 (0.3)	0.74* (0.43)
Co-partisan governor	-0.13 (0.34)	-0.18 (0.30)	-0.44 (0.46)	-0.16 (0.34)	-0.19 (0.3)	-0.44 (0.46)
Legislative Bill Initiation	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.01)	-5.52 (0.01)	0.004 (0.014)
Committee Leader	0.83 (0.51)	1.2*** (0.45)	0.93 (0.63)	0.82 (0.51)	1.17*** (0.45)	0.94 (0.63)
Discipline	16.0* (9.8)	18.7** (7.9)	32.01** (14.5)	15.2 (9.5)	18.1** (7.9)	32.6** (14.4)

¹⁶ Most of the deputies who had entered the Congress under the label of a party that did not win enough votes to maintain its registry were integrated into MORENA or one of its coalition parties, so we use the label that they held at the end of the congressional term.

	MODEL 1			MODEL 2		
	LOWER POST	RESELECTION	HIGHER POST	LOWER POST	RESELECTION	HIGHER POST
Substitute deputy				0.22 (0.62)	-0.86 (0.67)	-0.29 (1.14)
Changed parties				-0.16 (0.49)	-0.29 (0.41)	-0.74 (0.72)
Personal Scandal				-2.5** (1.1)	-1.8** (0.85)	-0.55 (1.17)
Left Congress, Returned				-0.75 (.62)	-1.6** (0.56)	-2.1* (1.1)
Disruption during Term	-0.72** (0.35)	-0.98*** (0.3)	-1.4*** (0.54)			
Gender	-0.42 (0.31)	0.05 (0.27)	-0.94** (0.42)	-0.37 (0.32)	-0.1 (0.27)	-0.98** (0.42)
Age	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.044*** (0.012)	-0.04** (0.2)	-0.042*** (0.015)	-0.04*** (0.012)	-0.04** (0.02)
Education						
college	-0.18 (0.41)	0.52 (0.36)	1.55* (0.8)	-0.29 (0.43)	0.34 (0.37)	1.6* (0.86)
graduate work	0.89 (0.47)	0.66 (0.42)	1.6* (0.86)	0.056 (0.43)	0.48 (0.44)	1.7* (0.88)
Constant	-14.4 (7.1)	-17.5** (7.6)	-33.1** (14.6)	-13.5 (9.5)	-17.4** (7.9)	-33.4** (14.5)
Observations	473	473	473	473	473	473
	Pseudo R2 = .15			Pseudo R2=.16		

As expected in Hypothesis 1, election type matters greatly: incumbents who entered the congress in 2018 via a plurality district tend to win reselection or a nomination to a higher post at a higher rate than those who won election to the Chamber via the PR lists, as seen in models 1 and 2.


Graph 1. Marginal Effects with Plurality Deputies vs PR Deputies



As expected, the effect of election type is quite strong; deputies who won a plurality district had over a 55% probability of winning a reselection bid, while those who were on the PR lists, had approximately a 27% chance (the solid blue line). The opposite is observed for those who did not win a post; over 40% came from the close PR lists, while about 17% were plurality winners in 2018. It is also clear that having come from an SMD helped the deputy win a nomination to a higher post.

Next, we address hypothesis 2 which posits that, if party leaders care about strengthening their faction, then they will reselect incumbents who are politically “closer” to them. We see the models in Table 3 above, that incumbent deputies with prior elected experience are more likely to win a renomination or a candidacy for a higher post, rather than a lower post or be left out of politics, while deputies with little or no prior background experience should be more likely to be nominated for a lower post, or no post at all (the difference between reselection and no post for a deputy with prior experience is strongly significant with a .83 coefficient). We do not know if their success at renomination stems from the fact that they are more qualified candidates or because they are better known to party leaders or some combination of the two. As noted above, we combine this measure with another that denotes good relations with party leaders – whether the incumbent held leadership posts within the 2018-2021 Chamber, which are either chosen by party leaders both within and outside the Chamber or are party leaders themselves.

Graph 2. Marginal Effects of Prior Elected Post and Committee Leadership Role




The differences among the four possible combinations interest us; a committee leader with prior experience has almost 60% probability of winning reselection

tion as opposed to a 10% possibility of walking away with no candidacy at all. Thus, the combination of these two leader-centric variables suggests that in fact, closeness to a party boss promotes reselection, although this does not constitute proof, but rather, is indicative. The opposite case is that of an inexperienced deputy who did not hold a congressional leadership post; she has a 32% chance of being excluded from all posts and a 40% chance of winning a reselection nod, a third lower than that of her more experienced colleague. Thus, the combination of these two leader-centric variables suggests that closeness to a party head promotes reselection.

Our next hypothesis tests whether those deputies with higher quality backgrounds who entered congress by winning a plurality district have a higher probability of winning a renomination or the candidacy for a higher post (normally at the sub-national level, especially as mayor). As noted above, entering the chamber via a victory in a plurality district means the incumbent has both local voter support and good relations with the party leaders that made these nomination decisions.

Graph 3. Marginal effects of prior elected post and election type on future positions




Looking at those who won a higher post in Graph 3, above, fewer incumbents win candidacies for higher posts than the alternatives, so we see lower probabilities for all types of combinations of prior elected experience and type of election. Still, the combination of prior elected experience and a plurality seat in 2018 helps the incumbent jump from a .05% to a 1.5% probability (the blue slanted line) of winning the nomination to a higher post, which is three times greater. The reselection story is clear as well: those with prior elected posts who

won a plurality district enjoy almost 60% probability, while those who entered through the lists with no experience winning elections have only a 25% chance (the red slanted line for reselected deputies).

For hypothesis 4, we took different measures of legislative behavior, and as expected, those deputies who voted more often with their caucus leader had a much stronger probability of winning reselection and a higher post. However, we realize that the personal discipline measure is problematic because of the extremely high level of discipline in the Mexican congress, as shown by Graph 4, below.

Graph 4. Distribution of Personal Discipline in Congress, 2018-2021¹⁷



Source: author's data base.

Because the discipline numbers are so tightly bunched between 98% and 100% of the votes, a one-point change would have a strong effect, but since that almost never occurs, we will simply acknowledge that deputies in Mexico continue to be extremely disciplined under almost all circumstances.

Legislative bill initiation, which measures the willingness of the deputy to work hard, does not carry any weight (again, across all models), as it is not significant, leading one to the conclusion that loyalty to the caucus is expected, but an individual's enterprising nature does not convince party leaders to renominate. In an interesting finding, to avoid the worst outcome of no future post or a lower post, the deputy cannot have been involved in any disruptions (switching

¹⁷ This measures the percentage of times that the deputy voted with her caucus leader.

parties, scandalous behavior, or being a replacement deputy), as this variable is highly significant and negative in all models except for the PR incumbents.

To sum up these findings: first, in line with expectations from the literature on the personal vote, those deputies who won access via a plurality district were far more likely to win a candidacy for reelection. In terms of candidate quality, those incumbents with elected experience are also more likely to win a chance at reelection, especially if they hold prior elected experience while those who were newcomers with no experience prior to 2018 were considered for lower posts or not given an opportunity in 2021. As expected, deputies with close relations to the party's selectors are more likely to win reselection or a candidacy to a higher post.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

This work asked which type of deputy, under which type of circumstances, was allowed to run for reelection to the federal congress in Mexico – with the corollary: which deputies were excluded from the distribution of posts in the immediate future or sent to a lower post. We showed evidence that party leaders are key actors in candidate selection, and that legislative candidates run active candidate-based campaigns in their plurality districts. We were able to find information on the immediate post that the incumbents were nominated or appointed to (save one). These outcomes were disaggregated into no future post; the opportunity to run for a lower post; a reselection; and a candidacy or appointment to a higher post.

To understand these outcomes, we posit that centralized candidate selection places enormous power in the hands of party leaders, but incumbents still have their individual preferences over future posts. We also argue that politicians wish to continue their careers in congress or in a higher post but are willing to accept lower posts if necessary. Committee and Chamber leadership posts hold weight on their own and become more powerful when combined with prior experience. In fact, it seems that committee leaders often are attached to high-level party chiefs and use these contacts to run again for the same post.

This work holds a place in the recent research on Mexican candidate selection and how this plays a role in legislative behavior, as discussed by Ascencio and Kerevel (2021); Kerevel (2015); Langston (2010). It is possible that the gradual transformation from more decentralized selection to choices made by a small coterie of party leaders can be linked to the impending reality of consecutive reelection, which was part of a reform passed in 2014, but not implemented fully at the federal level until 2021. Mexican party leaders are reluctant to give up their power over their deputies. One especially interesting note is that because of centralized selection, consecutive reelection does not appear to motivate deputies to vote against the wishes of their coordinator, as shown in Graph 4, above.

What do these findings mean in a comparative context? We examine works on other nations with similar electoral rules, such as Italy from 1994-2006. In a work that focuses on renominations for incumbents, Marino and Martocchia Diodati (2017) present similar findings to those shown above. For example, party switching is negatively related to renomination, as it is in Mexico. The forces that lead to a renomination are similar: in the Italian case, holding a legislative leadership post and having prior background in politics both lead to renomination. These are important findings for the Mexican congress because they demonstrate that certain variables remain significant across culture and level of legislative development. We have added an argument that goes beyond the finding that personal political traits are important factors in reselection, however, by recognizing that control over candidate selection helps determine rates of reselection and therefore, reelection. Candidate selection has largely been understudied in the quest to understand rates of reselection. Furthermore, it is very difficult to study the process of choosing who will represent the party at election time across national boundaries, as formal rules are often ignored, and backroom deals continue to matter. But, as new single or small 'N' cases continue to be published in the literature on selection, scholars will be better able to build up a store of current selection forms that can be used in studies of reselection.

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APPENDIX

A. Summary statistics.

	Observations	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min.	Max
FUTURE POST	476	1.36	0.97	0	4
COMMITTEE LEADER	499	.136	0.343	0	1
PRIOR LEGISL POST	499	0.43	0.495	0	1
SMD	499	0.6	0.49	0	1
COPARTISAN GOVERNOR	499	0.35	0.48	0	1
CONCURRENT STATE ELECTION	499	0.32	0.47	0	1
Vote with leg group	499	0.99	0.017	0.86	1
LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY	499	12.6	14.3	0	126
PARTY LEAD- ER	499	0.24	0.43	0	1
DISTRICT COMPETITION	297	17.3	17.1	- 19.2	55.9
AGE	499	47.6	11	22	85
EDUCATION LEVEL	499	2.1	0.66	1	3
GENDER	499	0.48	0.5	0	1
DISRUPTION*	499	0.21	0.41	0	1
CHANGED PARTY	499	0.106	0.31	0	1
SUBSTITUTE	499	0.04	0.2	0	1
SCANDAL	499	0.032	0.18	0	1
LEFT&RETURNED	499	0.05	0.22	0	1

*(COMBINED VARIABLE OF CHANGED PARTY, SUBSTITUTE, SCANDAL, AND LEFT POST AND RETURNED).

B. Newspaper articles on 2021 candidate selection.

<https://contrasena.com.mx/2021/02/16/a-prueba-democracia-interna-en-morena/>

<https://www.eloccidental.com.mx/local/mario-delgado-llama-a-la-unidad-morenista-en-jalisco-6470844.html>

<https://interdiario.com.mx/juanita-guerra-amarra-candidatura-a-diputacion-federal-otra-vez/>

<https://veracruz.lasillarota.com/estados/cacicazgos-enmarcan-seleccion-de-candidatos-a-la-diputacion-federal/468864>.

<http://calornoticias.mx/los-celos-y-la-ambicion-de-zaira-ochoa-imponen-a-suplente-como-candidata-en-cordoba>.

<https://sinfuero.com.mx/elites-del-priand-se-refugian-en-las-pluris-ante-escenario-adverso-aqui-las-listas-de-candidatos/>. ***

<https://www.elsoldesanjuandelrio.com.mx/local/define-pan-candidatos-a-diputaciones-federales-6325496.html>.

C. Newspaper Reports about Scandals.

Deputy's Name	Nature of Scandal	Reference
Julio César Ángeles Mendoza	Legally prohibited from running again.	https://criteriohidalgo.com/regiones/tula/diputado-por-tula-no-podria-reelegirse https://www.facebook.com/JCAngelesMendoza/
Roberto Ángel Domínguez Rodríguez	Got shot while he was a deputy.	
Benjamín Saúl Huerta Corona	Charged with child molestation.	https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/diputado-federal-de-morena-niega-haber-violentado-su-esposa-en-cancun AND https://www.palcoquintanarroense.com.mx/noticias-de-quintana-roo/luis-alegre-retornara-a-las-actividades-empresariales-y-no-buscara-la-reeleccion/
Luis Javier Alegre Salazar	Charged with beating his wife.	https://www.sinembargo.mx/07-10-2020/3873065
Martina Cazarez Yañez	Charged with hitting another deputy who made fun of her lack of education.	https://www.sinembargo.mx/07-10-2020/3873065
José Ricardo Delsol Estrada	Went after David Monreal for corruption; also sued his party because MORENA put in a female candidate for governor	https://agendapolitica.net/tag/jose-ricardo-delsol-estrada/ https://pulsoslp.com.mx/slp/infundado-juicio-por-candidatura-de-genero/1271287
Margarita Flores Sánchez	Scandal with the former governor of her state.	https://latinus.us/2021/03/03/desbandada-diputados-24-dejan-curul-ir-cargo-eleccion/ https://www.contrapesociudadano.com/acusan-a-diputado-de-morena-de-conducir-ebrio-y-atropellar-a-motociclista-en-neza/?fbclid=IwAR1sx7S11JhcTBCoLkVMcycx9gRZkqPHWV1HR4bMKxWTt8D38I0QeyYUoxw
Pedro Daniel Abasolo Sánchez	Accused of drunk driving and hitting a pedestrian.	https://www.lajornadadeorientemexico.com/puebla/eleusis-cordova-cuentas-congeladas/
Luis Eleusis Leónidas Córdova Morán	Had his personal bank accounts frozen by the government's financial investigation agency.	https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/dejan-solo-diputado-porque-morena-no-come-morena https://www.jornada.com.mx/ultimas/politica/2020/09/03/morena-podria-perder-mayoria-en-san-lazaro-por-diputado-lopez-castillo-6900.html
Manuel López Castillo	Accused other Morenista of being corrupt; threatened to leave and go to PT	https://www.animalpolitico.com/2021/02/respuesta-enrique-ochoa-reza-nota-cfe-contrato/
Enrique Ochoa Reza	Charged with giving contracts to a company investigated for giving bribes.	https://www.elrotativo.com.mx/index.php/policiaca-3/item/2169-jovenes-construyendo-el-futuro-un-verdadero-negocio
Edith García Rosales	Denounced corruption in Jóvenes al futuro February, 2021	https://criticadn.mx/nota/video-virtual-candidata-de-morena-en-bahia-de-banderas-envuelta-en-video-escandalo-podria-perder-candidatura/
Carmina Yadira Regalado Mardueño	A scandal when she became candidate for mayor.	

Deputy's Name	Nature of Scandal	Reference
Luz Estefanía Rosas Martínez	Thrown out of PRD because she voted in favor of Guardia Nacional.	https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/tag/luz-estefania-rosas-martinez
Porfirio Muñoz Ledo	Spent the last year in office criticizing MORENA.	
Juan Israel Ramos Ruiz	Complained publicly against morena leaders in Guanajuato. https://www.facebook.com/jisraelramosruiz/	https://www.elsoldeirapuato.com.mx/local/denuncian-imposicion-de-morena-6541906.html