Resumen

ALVARADO MARAMBIO, JOSÉ TOMÁS. Freedom of the will and causal powers. Veritas [online]. 2012, n.26, pp. 107-123. ISSN 0718-9273.  doi: 10.4067/S0718-92732012000100005.

This paper discusses a well-known objection to libertarian free will in a non-deterministic world. In a non-deterministic world the complete state of affairs of the world in an instant of time t is compatible with different alternative complete states of affairs in the future of t. It has been argued that, in so far as different alternatives are possible to a free decision, it is a matter of chance and luck that that decision is taken. If a free decision is a matter of luck, then the agent cannot be considered responsible for it. It is argued that the difficulty appears from an anti-realist conception of causality, where causal facts are supervenient on regularities or counterfactual dependences. A realist conception of causality can, then, explain how the agent is causally in control of the free decision taken when the decision does not fall under a regularity or a counterfactual dependence. Once considered how the agent is in control of the decision, it is argued that one cannot say that the free decision is a matter of luck for the agent.

Palabras clave : Freedom; determinism; causality; counterfactual dependence; chance.