Revista de filosofía
versión On-line ISSN 0718-4360
GONZALEZ, Rodrigo. MÁQUINAS SIN ENGRANAJES Y CUERPOS SIN MENTES: ¿CUÁN DUALISTA ES EL FUNCIONALISMO DE MÁQUINA DE TURING?. Rev. filos. [online]. 2011, vol.67, pp. 183-200. ISSN 0718-4360. http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-43602011000100012.
This article deals with how Turing Machine Functionalism turns out to be compatible with a form of Dualism, which involves that strong AI is not close to the original Materialism that inspired it in the nineteenth century. To support this thesis, I argue that there is a compelling coincidence between Descartes 'philosophy and this version of Functionalism, since the former holds that it is conceivable/possible to separate mind and body, while the latter holds that it is not strictly necessary that mental states are realized by the physical properties of real cogs and machines.
Palabras llave : Mind-Body problem; Dualism; Turing Machine Functionalism; Materialism.