Revista de filosofía
versión On-line ISSN 0718-4360
GONZALEZ, Rodrigo. EL TEST DE TURING: DOS MITOS, UN DOGMA. Rev. filos. [online]. 2007, vol.63, pp. 37-53. ISSN 0718-4360. http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-43602007000100003.
Debunking two commonly held myths and fleshing out its dogma, this article deals with the Turing Test, one of the most famous and controversial methods to assess the existence of mental life in the Philosophy of Mind. Firstly, I show why Turing never gave a definition ofintelligence. Secondly, I dispute claims that the Turing Test provides a necessary or sufficient condition ofintelligence. Thirdly, in view of its aim and the sort of evidence it offers, I consider whether or not Turing's test can be regarded as a scientific experiment in light of Fodor s theory. Finally, I argue that Turing is committed to a form of behaviourism and, further, confuses simulation an epistemic process which, being governed by verisimilitude, is successful when someone is caused to believe that the computer is intelligent with the duplication ofintelligence qua property, which takes place at an ontological level. This confusion involves a dogma and explains why, despite being devised as the final solution to the dilemma of whether or not programmed machines think, the Turing Test has precisely had the opposite effect for longer than five decades, stimulating the philosophical discussion on the nature of mind.
Palabras clave : test; intelligence; simulation; duplication; verisimilitude.